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We start our current issue with the inaugural presidential addressby Judge Russell Otter, the American Judges Association’s firstpresident who is a Canadian judge. Please join us in thanking
him for his service to AJA. 
Our regular “Thoughts from Canada” column and the first article both pro-
vide summaries of criminal cases heard before the Supreme Court of Canada
and the U.S. Supreme Court, respectively. We are fortunate to have Judge
Wayne Gorman, judge of the Provincial Court
of Newfoundland and Labrador, providing this
regular column on the Canadian Court. Our
annual contributor, Professor Charles D. Weis-
selberg, the Shannon C. Turner Professor of
Law at the University of California, Berkeley, is
joined by Juliana DeVries, a 2017 J.D. candi-
date at Berkeley Law, for the review of the past
Term’s U.S. Supreme Court criminal cases. The
article begins with a remembrance for Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Scalia’s transforma-
tive effect on U.S. criminal law. 
The current issue also includes a three-part article series addressing child-
custody evaluations. The point, counterpoint, and response address conflict-
ing views of the appropriateness of child-custody evaluations. Dr. Ira Turkat
is a licensed clinical psychologist who provides results from a survey of
divorced parents who had previously participated in a child-custody evalua-
tion by a psychologist. He highlights his concerns about the potential for neg-
ative effects on the children involved. We invited Drs. Jonathan Gould and
Allan Posthuma to provide a counterpoint, and in it they raise concerns with
Dr. Turkat’s survey methodology and note the importance of using custody
evaluations to move parties toward out-of-court settlements. Dr. Turkat’s
response reemphasizes his concerns and urges the judiciary to carefully con-
sider before ordering a custody evaluation. We hope you enjoy the authors’
spirited debate and consider both sides of the topic. 
Before you set this issue aside, be sure to check out the Resource Page, the
last page of this—and every—issue. This time we’re announcing a new prod-
uct from the American Judges Association: video interviews with leading fig-
ures in the movement to improve procedural fairness in court. Each video is
approximately 15 minutes or less and well worth your time to watch. – EB
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 131 of this
issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
Cover photo, Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkins@
mac.com). The cover photo is of the historic Pima
County Courthouse in Tucson, Arizona, which opened in
1929.
©2016, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to Associa-
tion Services, National Center for State Courts, Williams-
burg, Virginia 23185-4147.  Points of view or opinions
expressed in Court Review are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the positions of the National
Center for State Courts or the American Judges Associa-
tion.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
Cite as: 52 Ct. Rev. ___ (2016).
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The American Judges Association recently completedits annual conference in Toronto, Canada, from Sep-tember 26 to 29, 2016. The theme of the conference
was comparative law in Canada and the United States. It
focused on issues of common interest to judges on both
sides of the border. These included such contemporary
topics as “Judicial Ethics and Social Media,” “Wrongful
Convictions Across Borders,” “Cannabis and the Green-
ing of North America,” and “Judge’s Role in Ensuring
Constitutional Right to Counsel.” All sessions featured
leading academics and judges from Canada and the
United States. On one panel we were pleased
to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Guam, Robert Torres. A memorable
highlight was the eloquent address by Jus-
tice Rosalie Abella of the Supreme Court of
Canada. She emphasized the critical role of
the judiciary in ensuring the protection of
basic human rights in a democracy.
In an earlier address, when she was a
member of the Court of Appeal of Ontario in
2000, she articulated the difference between
the legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment as follows:
The judiciary has a different relation-
ship with the public. It is accountable less to the
public’s opinion and more to the public interest. It
discharges that accountability by being principled,
independent, and impartial. Of all the public insti-
tutions responsible for delivering justice, the judi-
ciary is the only one for whom justice is the exclu-
sive mandate. This means while legislatures
respond of necessity of the urgings of the public,
however we define it, judges, on the other hand,
serve only justice. 
(Justice Abella’s full remarks from that 2000 address can
be found at https://goo.gl/sRXF4n.) 
To discharge this critically important responsibility in
our rapidly changing world, it is imperative that the
judges benefit from continuing to attend and participate
in excellent educational programs. For almost 57 years,
the American Judges Association, the largest judges
association in North America, has provided outstanding
educational programming at its spring and fall confer-
ences, by the publication of superb white papers includ-
ing the highly acclaimed paper, “Procedural Fairness: A
Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction,” and by the publi-
cation of its quarterly journal, Court Review. AJA will
continue to fulfil its mandate of Making Better Judges®
with its upcoming midyear conference in Arlington, Vir-
ginia, from April 27 to 30, 2017. 
Our next annual conference will be held in Cleveland,
Ohio, from September 11 to 15, 2017, under the very
capable leadership of our president-elect, Judge Cather-
ine Shaffer. I urge judges in Canada and the United
States to avail themselves of these golden educational
opportunities. 
At the conclusion of the Toronto conference, I had the
distinct and historic honour of becoming
the first Canadian to be president of the
American Judges Association—a firm broad-
ening of its judicial horizon. This reflects
the international nature of AJA, as well as
the many common goals of all state, provin-
cial, and territorial judges and their role in
democracies to uphold the rule of law.  
At the meetings of the new Executive
Committee and Board of Governors, I was
thrilled to witness energetic participation
and eagerness of all members—new and
old.   This was amply evident in the lively
debates on ways to increase membership
and to strengthen AJA in fulfilling its man-
date. This renewed momentum augurs well for the
future growth and sustainability of AJA.
Currently, we are exploring innovative ways to deliver
our message and educate our members in our rapidly
changing electronic age by such means as the enhance-
ment of our webpage and its links, as well as the devel-
opment of an AJA app that would put AJA in the fore-
front of judicial education.  
To continue and strengthen AJA, we need to attract
new members and retain existing ones to become an
even stronger Voice of the Judiciary®. We need the help
of all of you reading this column and your colleagues to
assist in the recruitment of newly elected or appointed
judges in your jurisdiction. Our commitment is rein-
forced by the continuation of our very successful pro-
gram of offering a one-year free membership to newly
elected or appointed judges and the use of a gift mem-
bership from the Executive Committee and the Board of
Governors members to bring back former members.  
I am eager to toil hard and long on behalf of the
American Judges Association in Canada and the United
States to discharge our goals and objectives throughout
the coming year. I ask you to join me in this laudable
adventure.
Russell J. Otter
President’s Column
A TRULY BROADER JUDICIAL HORIZON
Footnotes
1. In addition, in another 2016 decision, R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31,
2016 CarswellBC 1999 (Can.), the Supreme Court decided to
“restate” the constitutional formulation it had developed in R. v.
Rodgers, 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Can.), in relation to
section 11(i) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Con-
stitution Act, 1982 (“Any person charged with an offence has the
right . . . if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for
the offence has been varied between the time of commission and
the time of sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser punishment.”). 
2. See R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, 2016 CarswellBC 1864 (Can.).
3. 2016 SCC 22, 2016 CarswellBC 1552 (Can.), decided June 9,
2016.
4. Id. ¶ 19.
5. 2016 SCC 11, 2016 CarswellAlta 502 (Can.), decided March 24,
2016.
6. Id. ¶ 35.
7. Id. ¶ 13.
It is not every year that the Supreme Court of Canadareverses itself. However, as will be seen, this year it did.1
In this column I am going to review the decisions rendered
by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2016 that involve criminal
matters. The decisions are reviewed based on categories.
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada considered a multi-
tude of issues involving criminal law, including defences, evi-
dence, and sentencing. The Court also considered the applica-
tion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitu-
tion Act, 1982, to various criminal-law provisions and proce-
dures. Interestingly, the Supreme Court reversed itself and set
new guidelines for the right to be “tried within a reasonable
time,” as guaranteed by section 11(b) of the Charter.2
Let us start with the Supreme Court’s consideration in 2016
of criminal offences.
OFFENCES
BESTIALITY
Section 160 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985,
sets out the offence of bestiality. However, it does not define
the elements of the offence. 
In R. v. D.L.W.,3 the Supreme Court concluded that the
offence of bestiality requires proof of penetration. The Court
held that the offence requires proof of “sexual intercourse
between a human and an animal”:
The term “bestiality” has a well-established legal mean-
ing and refers to sexual intercourse between a human
and an animal. Penetration has always been understood
to be an essential element of bestiality. Parliament
adopted that term without adding a definition of it and
the legislative history and evolution of the relevant pro-
visions show no intent to depart from the well-under-
stood legal meaning of the term. Moreover, the courts
should not, by development of the common law,
broaden the scope of liability for this offence, as the trial
judge did. Any expansion of criminal liability for this
offence is within Parliament’s exclusive domain. In
short, this case falls within Stephen’s first category: our
Code assumes the continuing existence of the common
law definition of this crime.4
INFANTICIDE
Section 233 of the Criminal Code defines the offence of
infanticide. The section refers to a requirement that the mind
of a mother who kills her newly born child be “disturbed.” 
In R. v. Borowiec,5 the Supreme Court held that the word
“disturbed” in section 233 means “mentally agitated,” “men-
tally unstable,” or “mental discomposure.”6 The Court
described the nature of the offence in the following manner:
Infanticide, which is defined in s. 233 of the Crimi-
nal Code, is a form of culpable homicide and applies in
the narrow set of circumstances where (1) a mother, by
a wilful act or omission, kills her newborn child (under
one year of age, as defined by the Criminal Code, s. 2)
and, (2) at the time of the act or omission, the mother’s
mind is “disturbed” either because she is not fully
recovered from the effects of giving birth or by reason of
the effect of lactation: B. (L.), [2011 ONCA 153,] at
para. 58.7
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8. Id. ¶ 35.
9. 2016 SCC 10, 2016 CarswellAlta 504 (Can.), decided March 23,
2016.
10. Id. ¶ 1 [quoting the Court of Appeal’s decision, R. v. Alcantara,
2015 ABCA 258, 2015 CarswellAlta 1475, ¶ 15 (Can. Alta.)].
11. 2016 SCC 5, 2016 CarswellAlta 78 (Can.), decided January 22,
2016.
12. 2000 SCC 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520 (Can.).
13. Meer, 2016 SCC 5, ¶ 2.
14. 2016 SCC 14, 2016 CarswellOnt 5652 (Can.), decided April 15,
2016.
15. Id. ¶ 22.
16. 2016 SCC 43, decided October 21, 2016.
17. In Canada, a sentence of less than two years’ imprisonment can be
served in a provincial institution rather than a federal institution. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the disturbance “must
be present at the time of the act or omission causing the
‘newly-born’ child’s death and the act or omission must occur
at a time when the accused is not fully recovered from the
effects of giving birth or of lactation.”8
PARTIES TO AN OFFENCE: AIDING AND ABETTING
Section 21(1) of the Criminal Code makes a person a party
to an offence if they aide or abet another person in committing
an offence. 
In R. v. Knapczyk,9 the Supreme Court adopted as correct
the following comments made by the Alberta Court of
Appeal:
On the correct application of the legal principles to the
facts found by the trial judge, it is an inescapable con-
clusion that the respondents aided and abetted the
offence of trafficking through distribution. Their acts
prevented or hindered interference with the accomplish-
ment of a criminal act. In this way, the respondents pro-
vided assistance and encouragement to Mr. Caines in the
commission of the offence of trafficking. There is a clear
link between the respondents’ acts and the commission
of the offence.10
PROCEDURE
COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL
In R. v. Meer,11 the Supreme Court reiterated the test it had
set out in R. v. G.D.B.12 for the setting aside of a conviction
based upon alleged incompetence of defence counsel: “To suc-
ceed in setting aside a trial verdict on the basis of the ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, the appellant must show ‘first, that
counsel’s acts or omissions constituted incompetence and sec-
ond, that a miscarriage of justice resulted.’”13
SENTENCING
PRE-SENTENCE CUSTODY
Section 719(3) of the Criminal Code allows a sentencing
judge to “take in account” (or “credit”) an offender for any
time spent by the offender in pre-sentence custody. However,
section 719(3.1) prohibits a sentencing judge from providing a
credit for pre-sentence custody greater than one day for each
day in pre-sentence custody if the offender was in custody
because bail was denied “primarily because of a previous con-
viction of the accused.”
In R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali,14 the Supreme Court held that
this provision violated section 7 of the Charter [the “right to
life, liberty and security . . . in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice”] because it was overbroad:
I conclude that the portion of the Truth in Sentencing Act
challenged in this appeal—the denial of any enhanced
credit for pre-sentence custody to persons to whom bail
is denied primarily because of a prior conviction—vio-
lates s. 7 of the Charter for another reason: it is over-
broad. Laws that curtail liberty in a way that is arbitrary,
overbroad or grossly disproportionate do not conform to
the principles of fundamental justice: Bedford v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101
(S.C.C.), at para. 105. Mr. Safarzadeh-Markhali con-
tends that the challenged provision violates all three of
these principles. For the reasons that follow, I conclude
that the challenged law is unconstitutionally overbroad,
because its effect is to deprive some persons of liberty for
reasons unrelated to its purpose. This conclusion makes
it unnecessary to address whether the law is arbitrary or
grossly disproportionate.15
JOINT SUBMISSIONS
In R. v. Anthony-Cook,16 the Supreme Court of Canada con-
sidered joint submissions.  In this case the accused pleaded
guilty to the offence of manslaughter. Counsel presented a
joint submission seeking the imposition of a period of 18
months’ imprisonment. The trial judge rejected the submission
and imposed a period of two years’, less a day, imprisonment,
followed by three years of probation.17 The accused appealed.
His appeal was dismissed by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal. He appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and imposed a
period of 18 months’ imprisonment. It set aside the probation
order. The Supreme Court concluded that the sentence jointly
submitted should have been imposed.  
The Court held that, in assessing a joint submission, a
Canadian sentencing judge must adopt a “public interest test.”
The Court described the test in the following manner:
Under the public interest test, a trial judge should not
depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the
proposed sentence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the
public interest. But, what does this threshold mean? Two
decisions from the Newfoundland and Labrador Court
of Appeal are helpful in this regard.
In Druken, at para. 29, the court held that a joint sub-
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18. 2016 SCC 43, ¶¶ 32-34.
19. 2016 SCC 32, 2016 CarswellNat 3179 (Can.), decided July 22,
2016.
20. Id. ¶ 24.
21. Id. ¶ 27.
22. Id. ¶ 33.
23. Id. ¶ 32.
24. 2016 SCC 24, 2016 CarswellAlta 1145 (Can.), decided June 23,
2016.
25. Id. ¶ 6.
mission will bring the administration of justice into dis-
repute or be contrary to the public interest if, despite the
public interest considerations that support imposing it,
it is so “markedly out of line with the expectations of
reasonable persons aware of the circumstances of the
case that they would view it as a break down in the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system”.  And,
as stated by the same court in R. v. B.O.2, 2010 NLCA 19
(CanLII), at para. 56, when assessing a joint submission,
trial judges should “avoid rendering a decision that
causes an informed and reasonable public to lose confi-
dence in the institution of the courts”.
In my view, these powerful statements capture the
essence of the public interest test developed by the Mar-
tin Committee. They emphasize that a joint submission
should not be rejected lightly, a conclusion with which I
agree.  Rejection denotes a submission so unhinged from
the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its
acceptance would lead reasonable and informed per-
sons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including
the importance of promoting certainty in resolution dis-
cussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the
justice system had broken down.18
THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
SECTION 7
Section 7 of the Charter states: “Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice.”
In R. v. Cawthorne,19 a member of the Canadian Armed
Forces was charged with an offence. He was acquitted, and the
Minister of National Defence, as authorized by the National
Defence Act, launched an appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada. The accused applied to quash the appeal, arguing that
the principles of fundamental justice were breached on the
basis that the Minister being a member of the Cabinet was not
independent from political influence in making prosecutorial
decisions. 
The Supreme Court held that “a prosecutor—whether it be
an Attorney General, a Crown prosecutor, or some other pub-
lic official exercising a prosecutorial function—has a constitu-
tional obligation to act independently of partisan concerns and
other improper motives.”20 However, the Court stated that
“partisan” is not “broadly synonymous with ‘political.’”21
The Court concluded that Parliament’s “conferral of author-
ity over appeals in the military justice system on the Minister
does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.”22 The Supreme Court indi-
cated that the Minister of Defence, “like the Attorney General
or other public officials with a prosecutorial function, is enti-
tled to a strong presumption that he exercises prosecutorial
discretion independently of partisan concerns. The mere fact
of the Minister’s membership in Cabinet does not displace that
presumption.”23
SECTION 8
Section 8 of the Charter prohibits “unreasonable” searches
or seizures. 
In R. v. Saeed,24 the Supreme Court held that the taking of a
penile swab from a suspect did not violate section 8 of the
Charter because it constituted a valid search incidental to
arrest, and, thus, any DNA evidence obtained from the swab-
bing was admissible:
[W]hile a penile swab constitutes a significant intrusion
on the privacy interests of the accused, the police may
nonetheless take a swab incident to arrest if they have
reasonable grounds to believe that the search will reveal
and preserve evidence of the offence for which the
accused was arrested, and the swab is conducted in a
reasonable manner.25
However, the Supreme Court set out “a number of factors to
guide police in conducting penile swabs incident to arrest rea-
sonably”:
1. The penile swab should, as a general rule, be con-
ducted at the police station; 
2. The swab should be conducted in a manner that
ensures the health and safety of all involved;
3. The swab should be authorized by a police officer act-
ing in a supervisory capacity;
4. The accused should be informed shortly before the
swab of the nature of the procedure for taking the
swab, the purpose of taking the swab, and the author-
ity of the police to require the swab; 
5. The accused should be given the option of removing
his clothing and taking the swab himself, and if he
does not choose this option, the swab should be
taken or directed by a trained officer or medical pro-
fessional, with the minimum of force necessary; 
6. The police officer(s) carrying out the penile swab
should be of the same gender as the individual being
swabbed, unless the circumstances compel other-
wise;
7. There should be no more police officers involved in
the swab than are reasonably necessary in the cir-
cumstances;
8. The swab should be carried out in a private area such
that no one other than the individuals engaged in the
swab can observe it; 
9. The swab should be conducted as quickly as possible
and in a way that ensures that the person is not com-
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In R. v. Jordan,32 the accused was charged with an offence
in December 2008. His trial ended in February 2013. He
applied for a stay of proceedings to be entered pursuant to
section 11(b) of the Charter due to the delay. 
The Supreme Court entered a stay of proceedings. In
doing so, the Court indicated that it was rejecting the frame-
work for section 11(b) that it had set out in R. v. Morin33 (a
balancing of factors). In its place, the Supreme Court created
a new framework, which involves “a presumptive ceiling”
beyond which delay from the date of the laying of the charge
to the actual or anticipated end of the trial will be “presumed
to be unreasonable,” unless “exceptional circumstances” jus-
tify the time period involved. The Court held that the pre-
sumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried in the provincial
court and 30 months for cases tried in the superior court (or
cases tried in the provincial court after a preliminary
inquiry). Delay attributable to or waived by the accused will
not count towards the presumptive ceiling.34
In R. v. Williamson,35 the accused was charged with a sex-
ual offence in January 2009. His trial ended in December
2011. Applying the new framework it set out in Jordan, the
Supreme Court entered a stay of proceedings. It held that
“although this is a close case, the transitional exceptional cir-
cumstance does not apply and, therefore, the delay is unrea-
sonable.”36
In R. v. Vassel,37 the accused was jointly charged with six
other individuals. It took over three years to proceed to trial.
The accused applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing that his
right to be tried within a reasonable period of time as protected
by section 11(b) of the Charter was breached. The Supreme
Court entered a stay of proceedings. It held that “a more proac-
tive stance on the Crown’s part was required”:
In fulfilling its obligation to bring all accused to trial
within a reasonable time, the Crown cannot close its
eyes to the circumstances of an accused who has done
everything possible to move the matter along, only to be
held hostage by his or her co-accused and the inability
of the system to provide earlier dates. That, unfortu-
nately, is what occurred here.38
SECTION 12
Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
prohibits “cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.” 
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pletely undressed at any one time; and 
10. A proper record should be kept of the reasons for
and the manner in which the swabbing was con-
ducted.26
SECTION 11(I)
Section 11(i) of the Charter states that if the punishment for
an offence is varied after a person commits an offence but
before sentencing, the person is entitled to “the benefit of the
lesser punishment.” 
In R. v. K.R.J.,27 the Supreme Court considered whether pro-
visions in the Criminal Code that allow a judge to prohibit an
offender who committed a sexual offence from having contact
with young persons (section 161(1)(c)) or using the Internet
(section 161(1)(d)) applied to sentencing for an offence com-
mitted before their enactment. The Court decided to “restate”
the definition of “punishment” it had formulated in R. v.
Rodgers28:
Thus, I would restate the test for punishment as fol-
lows in order to carve out a clearer and more meaning-
ful role for the consideration of the impact of a sanction:
a measure constitutes punishment if (1) it is a conse-
quence of conviction that forms part of the arsenal of
sanctions to which an accused may be liable in respect
of a particular offence, and either (2) it is imposed in
furtherance of the purpose and principles of sentencing,
or (3) it has a significant impact on an offender’s liberty
or security interests.29
The Supreme Court held that both provisions violated sec-
tion 11(i) of the Charter because they “are a consequence of
conviction, imposed in furtherance of the purpose and princi-
ples of sentencing, and they can have a significant impact on
the liberty and security of offenders.”30 However, the Court
found section 161(1)(d) to be constitutional because it consti-
tuted a reasonable limit “prescribed by law” that “can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” in
compliance with section one of the Charter.31
SECTION 11(B)
Section 11(b) of the Charter indicates that any “person
charged with an offence has the right . . . to be tried within a
reasonable time.” 
26. Id. ¶ 78; see Don Stuart, Saeed: A Pragmatic, Limited Police Power
to Take Penile Swabs Without a Warrant, 29 CRIM. REP. (7th) 51
(2016).
27. 2016 SCC 31, 2016 CarswellBC 1999 (Can.), decided July 21,
2016.
28. 2006 SCC 15, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 554 (Can.).
29. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, ¶ 41. It is interesting to compare this deci-
sion with Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2476 (2016). In Welch,
the Supreme Court of the United States, in considering whether
constitutional decisions applied on a retroactive basis, adopted an
approach based on procedural versus substantive decisions. 
30. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, ¶ 57.
31. Section one of the Charter indicates that it “guarantees the rights
and freedoms set out” subject to “such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.”  
32. 2016 SCC 27, 2016 CarswellBC 1864 (Can.), decided July 8,
2016.
33. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (Can.).
34. See Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, ¶ 105.
35. 2016 SCC 28, 2016 CarswellOnt 10704 (Can.), decided July 8,
2016.
36. See id. ¶ 25-30.
37. 2016 SCC 26, 2016 CarswellAlta 1213 (Can.), decided June 30,
2016.
38. Id. ¶ 7.
In R. v. Lloyd,39 the accused was convicted of the offence of
possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of traf-
ficking. Because of a prior conviction for a similar offence, he
was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year of
imprisonment, pursuant to section 5(3)(a)(i)(D) of the Con-
trolled Drugs and Substances Act.
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded the mandatory
minimum sentence of one year of imprisonment violated sec-
tion 12 of the Charter on the basis that it “‘casts its net over a
wide range of potential conduct’. . . . As a result, it catches
not only the serious drug trafficking that is its proper aim, but
conduct that is much less blameworthy. This renders it consti-
tutionally vulnerable.”40
DEFENCES
ALIBI
In R. v. Laliberté,41 the Supreme Court held  that when the
defence of alibi is raised, a trial judge “must specify” in her or
his instruction to the jury that “the fabrication of an alibi sup-
ports an inference of consciousness of guilt, but no more than
that.”42 The Court also held that there must be other evidence
“independent of the finding that the alibi is false on the basis
of which a reasonable jury could conclude that the alibi was
deliberately fabricated and that the accused was involved in
that attempt to mislead the jury.”43
EVIDENCE
ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF A
THIRD PARTY
In World Bank Group v. Wallace,44 the accused were charged
with the offence of bribing foreign public officials. The accused
sought access to records in the possession of investigators of
the World Bank. The Supreme Court dismissed the applica-
tion, holding that “[t]he World Bank Group’s immunities cover
the records sought and its personnel, and they have not been
waived. Moreover, the records [of an independent unit within
the World Bank Group] were not disclosable under Canadian
law.”45
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
In R. v. Villaroman,46 the Supreme Court considered the law
in relation to circumstantial evidence. 
The Supreme Court held that in “assessing circumstantial
evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to
arise from proven facts . . . . Requiring proven facts to sup-
port explanations other than guilt wrongly puts an obligation
on an accused to prove facts and is contrary to the rule that
whether there is a reasonable doubt is assessed by considering
all of the evidence. The issue with respect to circumstantial
evidence is the range of reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from it. If there are reasonable inferences other than
guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.”47
The Court held when a trial judge assesses circumstantial
evidence, she or he must consider “‘other plausible theor[ies]’
. . . inconsistent with guilt”:
When assessing circumstantial evidence, the trier of
fact should consider “other plausible theor[ies]” and
“other reasonable possibilities” which are inconsistent
with guilt . . . . I agree with the appellant that the
Crown thus may need to negative these reasonable pos-
sibilities, but certainly does not need to “negative every
possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful,
which might be consistent with the innocence of the
accused”: R. v. Bagshaw (1971), [1972] S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.),
at p. 8. “Other plausible theories” or “other reasonable
possibilities” must be based on logic and experience
applied to the evidence or the absence of evidence, not
on speculation.48
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada considered
a number of issues in 2016 related to criminal law and proce-
dure. This included the defence of alibi (R. v. Laliberté) and
parties to an offence (R. v. Knapczyk). 
In the realm of offences, the Supreme Court considered the
offences of bestiality (R. v. D.L.W.) and infanticide (R. v.
Borowiec).
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2016.
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46. 2016 SCC 33, 2016 CarswellAlta 1411 (Can.), decided July 29,
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47. Id. ¶ 35.
48. Id. ¶ 37. In The Queen v. Baden-Clay, [2016] HCA 35 (Austl.),
decided August 31, 2016, the High Court of Australia considered
a similar issue. It explained its view of the difference between a
“reasonable inference” and “conjecture” in the following manner
(at paragraph 47):
For an inference to be reasonable, it “must rest upon
something more than mere conjecture. The bare possibility
of innocence should not prevent a jury from finding the
prisoner guilty, if the inference of guilt is the only infer-
ence open to reasonable men upon a consideration of all
the facts in evidence” (emphasis added). Further, “in con-
sidering a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances
established by the evidence are to be considered and
weighed in deciding whether there is an inference consis-
tent with innocence reasonably open on the evidence”
(emphasis added). The evidence is not to be looked at in a
piecemeal fashion, at trial or on appeal. 
In the constitutional context, the Court declared a mini-
mum mandatory sentence unconstitutional (R. v. Lloyd) and
considered the role of the prosecutor (R. v. Cawthorne).
Finally, it is difficult to predict over the course of a year
which decision rendered by a Supreme Court will have the
most significant long-term effect. For the Supreme Court of
Canada in 2016, I would choose the Court’s decision in Jordan.
Not only did the Supreme Court take the exceptional step of
reversing itself, it set out a framework that might lead to many
criminal charges being stayed.49
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Ont.); R. v. Dunphy, 2016 NSSC 224, 2016 CarswellNS 722 (Can.
N.S.), R. v. Tran, 2016 ONCJ 528, 2016 CarswellOnt 13730 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Lam, 2016 ABQB 489, 2016 CarswellAlta 1647 (Can.
Alta.); R. v. Beausoleil, 2016 QCCQ 8914, 2016 CarswellQue 8182
(Can. Que.). They have been refused in R. v. Smythe, 2016 ONCJ
620, 2016 CarswellOnt 16467 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Park, 2016 SKPC
137, 2016 CarswellSask 664 (Can. Sask.); R. v. Ramsay, 2016
ONCJ 569, 2016 CarswellOnt 14580; R. v. Kopalasingam, 2016
ONCJ 486, 2016 CarswellOnt 12682 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Swami-
nathan, 2016 ONSC 4913, 2016 CarswellOnt 12558 (Can. Ont.);
R. v. Gandhi, 2016 ONSC 5612, 2016 CarswellOnt 13863 (Can.
Ont.); R. v. Fauolo, 2016 ABPC 192, 2016 CarswellAlta 1674
(Can. Alta.); R. v. Da Silva, 2016 ONCJ 480, 2016 CarswellOnt
12578 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Kennedy, 2016 ONSC 4654, 2016 Car-
swellOnt 13204 (Can. Ont.); R. v. Howe, 2016 NSSC 184, 2016
CarswellNS 618 (Can. N.S.); R. v. Ly, 2016 ONCJ 545, 2016 Car-
swellOnt 13928 (Can. Ont.); and R. v. Curry, 2016 BCSC 1435,
2016 CarswellBC 2152 (Can. B.C.).
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Footnotes
1. We are grateful to Professor Tejas Narechania for suggesting this
characterization of the Court’s Term.
2. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
3. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
4. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
5. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
6. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7. 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
8. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
9. 554 U.S. 164, 179 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quipping that
“the Court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue
of being politically correct”).
10. 488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that
Congress’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission violates separation-of-powers principles by creating a
“junior-varsity Congress”).
11. 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
use of closed-circuit television for child witnesses violates the
Confrontation Clause; “[f]or good or bad, the Sixth Amendment
requires confrontation, and we are not at liberty to ignore it”).
12. 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution permits Miranda v. Arizona to be replaced by statute;
“[t]he Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda majority, offended
by a criminal’s commendable qualm of conscience or fortunate fit
of stupidity”).
13. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending
that the State may not take DNA samples from arrestees; “if the
Court’s identification theory is not wrong, there is no such thing
as error”).
14. 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
an anonymous tip of a traffic violation does not amount to rea-
sonable suspicion of drunk driving and accusing the majority
opinion of “serv[ing] up a freedom-destroying cocktail”).
15. 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (joining the
majority but expressing the willingness to find that officers
should not be able to search vehicles incident to arrest on the
ground of officer safety).
17. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
18. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
19. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (911 call was not testimonial).
20. 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (forensic analysts’ affidavits were testimo-
nial).
In a way, we had not one but two Supreme Courts last Term.1The first Court sat from October 5, 2015, to February 12,2016. The Term of the successor Court began on February
13, 2016, when Associate Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly
passed away on a Texas ranch. We will review important crim-
inal-law decisions from both 2015-2016 Courts. But for those
who adjudicate, study, prosecute, or defend criminal cases, the
death of Justice Scalia was the most significant aspect of the
year. Whether one was a fan of his jurisprudence or not, it is
impossible to deny his outsized impact upon the Court for
almost three decades. We will begin by noting some of his most
influential criminal-law and procedure opinions before turning
to the rulings of the 2015-2016 Term.
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW—A REMEMBRANCE
During his decades on the bench, Justice Antonin Scalia
authored transformative opinions in criminal law and proce-
dure. 
Justice Scalia shaped Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
with decisions such as United States v. Jones,2 the GPS-tracking-
device case, which reintroduced property-law principles in
determining what amounts to a search. He also wrote the dog-
sniff sequel of Florida v. Jardines.3 In Jardines, as well as in the
thermal-imaging-device case of Kyllo v. United States,4 Justice
Scalia established himself as the Court’s fiercest protector of
the home. Justice Scalia was less fond, however, of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, as demonstrated in Hudson v.
Michigan,5 which removed “knock and announce” violations
from the scope of the rule. 
Justice Scalia authored the foundational opinion in Whren v.
United States,6 upholding the pretext use of traffic infractions,
and in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,7 which did the same with material-
witness warrants. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,8 he vigor-
ously supported a defendant’s right to choose retained counsel,
and he dissented in Indiana v. Edwards9 to support the right of
a defendant with a severe mental illness to represent himself.
His dissent in Edwards was characteristically fiery, just like his
disagreements with the majorities in Mistretta v. United States,10
Maryland v. Craig,11 Dickerson v. United States,12 Maryland v.
King,13 and Navarette v. California.14 Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence in Thornton v. United States15 directly led to the Court’s
change of position in Arizona v. Gant, which restricted searches
of automobiles incident to the driver’s arrest, though the jurist
would have gone even further.16 He also wrote for the majority
in District of Columbia v. Heller,17 finding that the District of
Columbia’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates
the Second Amendment.
It is difficult to select which of his opinions will have the
most lasting importance, but surely a leading contender is
Crawford v. Washington,18 which invoked the Confrontation
Clause to overturn the longstanding rule that an unavailable
witness’s out-of-court statement could be admitted if it bore
adequate indicia of reliability. He wrote for the Court in the
later Confrontation Clause cases of Davis v. Washington19 and
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts20 and then fought to prevent
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senting) (arguing that a gunshot victim’s statements were testi-
monial); Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2264 (2012)
(Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor) (contending that a defendant has the right to cross-
examine the analyst who generated a DNA profile).
22. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
23. 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
24. Id. at 2059-60.
25. Id. at 2061.
26. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
27. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061-63.
28. Id. at 2071, 2072-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2064, 2069-71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
30. Orin Kerr, Opinion Analysis: The Exclusionary Rule Is Weakened
But It Still Lives, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2016, 9:35 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-the-
exclusionary-rule-is-weakened-but-it-still-lives/.
31. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (“To trig-
ger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate . . . . As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule
serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct
. . . .”).
the Court from retreating from Crawford in a series of dis-
sents.21
Perhaps we may soon know whom President-elect Trump
will select to replace Justice Antonin Scalia. But whomever the
nominee may be, it is difficult to imagine a justice who will
have a greater or more lasting impact on constitutional crimi-
nal law and procedure.
Now on to the opinions from 2015-2016.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The year provided two significant Fourth Amendment deci-
sions that matter for the day-to-day functioning of the criminal
law. The most noteworthy (and, for us, most puzzling) opinion
was Utah v. Strieff,22 which applied the attenuation doctrine to
uphold admission of evidence following an unconstitutional
investigatory stop. Strieff may narrow the exclusionary rule
going forward. Another important case this Term, Birchfield v.
North Dakota,23 addressed whether officers may obtain breath
or blood evidence of intoxication without a warrant as part of
a search incident to arrest. 
In Strieff, a detective received an anonymous tip of narcotics
activity at a home. He conducted intermittent surveillance and
stopped one visitor leaving the home. When the visitor,
Edward Strieff, produced his identification, the detective called
it in and learned that Strieff had an outstanding arrest warrant
for a traffic violation. The detective then arrested and searched
Strieff, finding methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The
State conceded that the stop was without reasonable suspicion,
and the State only learned of the outstanding warrant and the
contraband as a result of the stop. The Utah Supreme Court
found that the evidence was inadmissible, but the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed.24
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Thomas noted
that under the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible
“when the connection between unconstitutional police con-
duct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by
some intervening circumstance” such that suppressing the evi-
dence would not serve the interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment.25 Analyzing the case under the factors articulated
in Brown v. Illinois,26 the Court found that while the temporal
proximity of the unlawful stop and the search favored exclu-
sion, two other factors counseled in favor of admission. The
warrant was an “intervening circumstance” because its exis-
tence predated the stop and was independent of it. Further, the
officer’s conduct was not purposeful or flagrant; it was, at
most, negligent.27
Three justices dissented. Jus-
tice Kagan, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, disputed the majority’s
application of the attenuation
doctrine, characterizing the
detective’s conduct as purposeful
and not an innocent mistake.
Nor were they willing to con-
sider the discovery of the war-
rant to be an intervening circum-
stance; it was a foreseeable con-
sequence of the stop, and the
detective testified that checking
for outstanding warrants was a normal practice. They con-
cluded that the majority’s opinion creates incentives for police
to make suspicionless stops.28
Justice Sotomayor also dissented in a forceful opinion
joined in part by Justice Ginsburg. In a section written only
for herself, Justice Sotomayor described the impact of unlaw-
ful stops upon ordinary Americans, and especially people of
color: 
For generations, black and brown parents have given
their children “the talk”—instructing them never to run
down the street; always keep your hands where they can
be seen; do not even think of talking back to a
stranger—all out of fear of how an officer with a gun
will react to them. . . . Until their voices matter too, our
justice system will continue to be anything but.29
It will be interesting to see the impact of Strieff in the years
ahead. One astute observer, Professor Orin Kerr, remains
unpersuaded by the majority’s analysis of the Brown factors. He
thinks of an “intervening circumstance” as “an outside event
that changes what is expected to happen,” and the stop here
“unfolded exactly as the officer expected it would.”30 We agree
and find it difficult to foresee how future courts will interpret
“intervening circumstances.” Further, a capacious definition of
“intervening circumstances” can substantially narrow the
exclusionary rule and create incentives for officers to conduct
suspicionless stops. In addition, along with Kerr, we note that
the majority inferred that the officer’s conduct was at most neg-
ligent, even though the record did not contain much evidence
either way. We will see whether this case leads courts to con-
sider officers’ subjective intent in assessing either attenuation
or the overall application of the exclusionary rule.31
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43. Assuming he voted with the majority in Strieff, there is a signifi-
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the opinion. Strieff was argued in the February 2016 sitting. We
note that Justice Thomas, who wrote for the Court in Strieff, was
also assigned the opinion in another case from the February sit-
ting, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
1969 (2016). Assigning Strieff to Justice Scalia would have more
evenly spread the Court’s workload and perhaps made sense,
given his prior opinion in Hudson.
44. 136 S. Ct. 1609 (2016).
45. 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).
46. 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
47. 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016).
48. 136 S. Ct. 2 (2015) (per curiam).
Birchfield is a sequel to Mis-
souri v. McNeeley,32 where the
Court found that the natural
dissipation of alcohol from the
bloodstream does not always
amount to exigent circum-
stances that justify taking a
blood sample without a war-
rant. All 50 states have enacted
“implied consent” laws, requir-
ing motorists to consent to tests
for blood alcohol concentration
(BAC) as a condition of driving.
Some states have also criminalized the refusal to undergo test-
ing. Birchfield addresses three different defendants’ appeals, all
related to whether an arrested person may refuse to consent to
a blood or breath test and whether that refusal may be crimi-
nalized. In all of the cases, the defendants were first placed
under arrest, and the officers later sought to obtain BAC evi-
dence.
Justice Alito’s majority opinion begins with a primer on
laws relating to driving under the influence, including
informed consent.33 The opinion then reviews the principles of
searches incident to arrest, culminating in the ruling two
Terms ago in Riley v. California.34 The Riley Court reaffirmed
the “categorical” approach to searches incident to arrest. The
authority to search depends on the fact of arrest and is permit-
ted to further officer safety and preserve evidence. In deter-
mining “whether to exempt a given type of search from the
warrant requirement,” courts assess “on the one hand, the
degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and,
on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promo-
tion of legitimate governmental interests.”35 Applying these
principles, subjecting motorists to a breath test does not impli-
cate significant privacy concerns, furthers legitimate govern-
mental interests, and may be performed incident to arrest,
without a warrant.36 “Blood tests are a different matter.”37 They
require piercing the skin, and give law enforcement a sample
that can be preserved and used for other purposes. They may
not be obtained without a warrant, incident to arrest.38 The
majority also found that, while implied-consent laws may
impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on those
who refuse consent, motorists “cannot be deemed to have con-
sented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a crim-
inal offense.”39 The Court affirmed one defendant’s conviction
for refusing a warrantless breath test, reversed a conviction for
refusing a warrantless blood draw, and remanded where a
defendant submitted to a blood test after being told he had no
right to refuse.40
Five justices were in the majority. Justices Sotomayor and
Ginsburg dissented from the majority’s conclusion with respect
to breath tests. They disagreed with the application to breath
tests of the search-incident-to-arrest framework. They would
find that officers should obtain a warrant for BAC evidence
unless exigent circumstances exist in a particular case.41 Jus-
tice Thomas wrote separately to state his disagreement with
McNeely. He would instead hold that both blood and breath
BAC tests may be performed without a warrant due to exigent
circumstances.42
Strieff and Birchfield were both decided by the Court with-
out Justice Scalia. Would they have been decided differently
before his passing? Justice Scalia had strong views about the
scope of the exclusionary rule and the attenuation doctrine, as
Hudson shows. In McNeely, he joined the majority in finding
no exigent circumstances, as a categorical matter, to support
warrantless blood draws. His vote was not necessary to obtain
numerical majorities—each opinion commanded five votes—
yet his voice was loud on Fourth Amendment issues. We may
never know how these two opinions would read had he lived
to see them written—or, perhaps, had he authored them him-
self.43
SIXTH AMENDMENT
Last Term the Court issued a number of substantial Sixth
Amendment rulings, plus a per curiam reversal. Betterman v.
Montana44 answered whether the speedy-trial guarantee
applies to sentencing: it does not. In Hurst v. Florida,45 the jus-
tices overturned Florida’s capital-punishment system, reinforc-
ing the principle that the jury must find the facts necessary to
a capital judgment. Luis v. United States46 is an important rul-
ing about seizing assets that deprive a defendant of counsel of
choice. United States v. Bryant47 addressed the use of uncoun-
seled tribal-court convictions as predicate offenses for prose-
cutions under a federal statute. And in Maryland v. Kulbicki,48
the justices summarily reversed a state court that faulted
defense counsel for not uncovering a report about the validity
of a certain type of forensic evidence.
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SPEEDY TRIAL
Betterman is the Sixth Amendment decision with the broad-
est applicability. Brandon Betterman failed to show up in court
for a domestic-violence assault charge. He was charged with
bail-jumping and pleaded guilty to that offense. Betterman was
then held for 14 months before sentencing, and he argued that
the sentencing delay violated the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy
Trial Clause. The Court found, unanimously, that the Clause
does not apply to delayed sentencing.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg divided criminal
proceedings into three phases. The first phase, before arrest or
indictment, may be governed by the Due Process Clause,
which protects against fundamentally unfair prosecutorial con-
duct.49 The Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies in
the second period; it attaches upon arrest or indictment and
lasts through conviction. But this Sixth Amendment right then
detaches upon conviction, which triggers the third stage that
lasts until sentencing.50
The Court found that this division of the criminal proceed-
ing into three stages, with the Speedy Trial Clause only apply-
ing during the second stage, is consistent with the purposes
and historical understanding of the speedy-trial right. The
three-stage model “reflect[s] the concern that a presumptively
innocent person should not languish under an unresolved
charge.”51 Moreover, the language of the Sixth Amendment ref-
erences the “accused,” not someone already convicted.52 While
guilty pleas may be prevalent in our system, making sentenc-
ing the main event for most defendants, factual disputes at sen-
tencing do not relate to the question of guilt.53 To the extent
that sentencing proceedings are unduly delayed, rules of court
and the Due Process Clause may still be relevant. Justice
Thomas (joined by Justice Alito) and Justice Sotomayor con-
curred to address possible applications of the Due Process
Clause.54
RIGHT TO A DECISION BY A JURY
In Hurst, an 8-1 decision with Justice Scalia in the major-
ity, the Court overturned Florida’s capital-punishment scheme
because it does not require a jury to find the facts necessary
to sentence a defendant to death. Timothy Hurst received the
death penalty from a judge, who found sufficient aggravating
circumstances to impose a sentence of death following an
advisory verdict by a jury.
In the foundational case of Ring v. Arizona,55 the Court
found that Arizona’s capital-sentencing scheme violated the
Sixth Amendment (and the
Apprendi v. New Jersey56 line of
cases) because Arizona permit-
ted a judge rather than a jury to
find the facts required to sen-
tence a defendant to death. In
several cases, such as Spaziano v.
Florida57 and Hildwin v. Florida,58
the Court had expressed support
for Florida’s capital-sentencing
scheme, holding in both cases
that the jury need not make the
specific findings authorizing the
sentence of death. Hurst over-
turned Spaziano and Hildwin as irreconcilable with Apprendi
and Ring.59 The Court did not reach the question of whether
the error was harmless but overruled Spaziano and Hildwin “to
the extent they allow a sentencing judge to find an aggravating
circumstance, independent of a jury’s factfinding, that is nec-
essary for imposition of the death penalty.”60 Justice Breyer
concurred in the judgment.61 Justice Alito was the lone dis-
senter, arguing that a Florida judge essentially fills a reviewing
function and that any error was harmless.62
Apart from its importance for the state of Florida, Hurst
makes clear that Ring stands strong. A jury must make the fac-
tual findings necessary to sentence a defendant to death.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In the forfeiture ruling, Luis, Justice Breyer, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, con-
cluded that “the pretrial restraint of legitimate, untainted assets
needed to retain counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amend-
ment.”63 Justice Thomas concurred, providing the fifth vote.64
The federal government charged Sila Luis in 2012 with
healthcare fraud in the amount of $45 million, almost all of
which she had already spent by the time she was indicted.
When the government caught up with her, Luis had $2 million
in her possession, which the district court ordered frozen for
potential future payment of restitution and other criminal
penalties, but which Luis wished to spend on her defense. The
government and Luis agreed that the frozen $2 million were
legitimate, untainted funds not connected to the alleged
crime.65
The plurality recognized that past Supreme Court cases
allowed the government to freeze a criminal defendant’s assets
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pretrial and prevent her from
using those assets to hire her
counsel of choice.66 They dis-
tinguished these precedents,
however, as limited to
restraint of a criminal defen-
dant’s tainted assets, that is,
those traceable to the crime
charged. In contrast, the
court order here prevented
Luis from using her own
money to hire the private
defense counsel of her
choice.
Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion reasons that the govern-
ment has a substantial property interest in tainted assets that it
does not have in untainted property. It also balances the inter-
est in the fundamental right to assistance of counsel against the
government’s contingent interest in securing criminal forfei-
ture and the victim’s interest in restitution and finds that the
Sixth Amendment right trumps. It notes the impact that an
opposite decision would have on the public defense system:
“accepting the Government’s views would—by increasing the
government-paid-defender workload—render less effective the
basic right the Sixth Amendment seeks to protect.”67 The plu-
rality additionally surmised that “the constitutional line we
have drawn should prove workable” because “the law has trac-
ing rules that help courts implement the kind of distinction we
require in this case.”68
Concurring, Justice Thomas agreed that freezing untainted
assets pretrial violates the Sixth Amendment, reasoning that
“constitutional rights necessarily protect the prerequisites for
their exercise.”69 He disagreed, however, with the plurality’s
“balancing approach,”70 arguing that such balancing “‘do[es]
violence’ to the constitutional design.”71
Justice Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Alito. His main criticism of the plurality was that the distinction
between tainted and untainted assets makes little sense because
money is fungible. “There is no difference,” he asserts,
“between a defendant who has preserved his or her own assets
by spending stolen money and a defendant who has spent his
or her own assets and preserved stolen cash instead.”72
Justice Kagan wrote a separate and short but intriguing dis-
sent. She would have revisited the “troubling” decision in Mon-
santo, which held that the government is allowed to freeze
tainted assets pretrial that the defendant needs to hire an attor-
ney. However, given that Luis did not ask the Court to overturn
Monsanto, Justice Kagan agreed with the principal dissent that
there is no difference between tainted and untainted assets,
since that money is fungible.73
This case will likely have the largest impact on white-collar
defendants, who might have legitimate assets in addition to
and separate from those linked to their alleged crimes, and on
the private criminal-defense bar, which may lose fewer clients
to public-defender offices. It will also be interesting to see if
counsel latch on to Justice Kagan’s dissent and try to challenge
the constitutionality of the Monsanto decision. Courts will also
have to hold traceability hearings or find another way to sepa-
rate tainted from untainted assets, which may prove more dif-
ficult than Justice Breyer predicts. 
The Term’s other right-to-counsel case was Bryant, which
concerned a conviction under a federal statute that makes it a
crime for any person to commit a domestic assault in Indian
country if the person has at least two prior convictions for
domestic violence.74 Bryant had multiple prior tribal-court con-
victions, which were uncounseled and included jail time. Had
Bryant been convicted in state or federal courts, those prior
convictions would have been obtained in violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. But it is well settled that the Sixth
Amendment does not apply to tribal-court proceedings. Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg noted that the tribal-
court convictions “did not violate the Sixth Amendment when
obtained, and they retain their validity” when invoked as pred-
icate offenses in a federal prosecution.75 The Court’s opinion
also points to the high rates of domestic violence among Native
American women, the complex patchwork of law that makes it
difficult to address this violence, and the inability or unwilling-
ness of states to fill the enforcement gap.76
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Finally, in Kulbicki, the justices summarily reversed a state
court that had found that counsel’s performance was deficient
for failing to uncover a report about the reliability of bullet-
fragment forensic evidence. Kulbicki was convicted of murder
in 1995 in a trial where the State’s expert purportedly matched
the composition of lead in a bullet fragment in the victim’s
brain with a bullet fragment in the defendant’s truck. A 1991
report undermined the legitimacy of “Comparative Bullet Lead
Analysis,” although courts widely accepted this analytical
technique until 2003. The Supreme Court ruled that a diligent
search would not necessarily have discovered the early report
undermining the bullet expert’s analysis, so counsel’s perfor-
mance was not deficient.77
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Court decided three notable Eighth Amendment cases
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this Term. Justice Scalia provided the majority opinion in one
and a dissent in another, and the third was issued after his
death. In Kansas v. Carr,78 the Court opined on whether the
Eighth Amendment requires courts to instruct capital-sentenc-
ing juries regarding the burden of proof for mitigating circum-
stances. Montgomery v. Louisiana79 raised the question of
whether the rule announced in Miller v. Alabama applies
retroactively on state collateral review. And in Lynch v. Ari-
zona,80 the Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme
Court, which had upheld the death penalty where the trial
court did not allow the defendant to inform the sentencing
jury that he was parole ineligible. 
In his last majority opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
delivered the ruling in Carr, where eight justices agreed that
the Kansas Supreme Court improperly vacated the death sen-
tences of Sidney Gleason, Reginald Carr, and Jonathan Carr.
Gleason had participated in a conspiracy to rob an elderly man
and then murder Gleason’s co-conspirator and her boyfriend.
The Carr brothers committed a series of heinous crimes, set
out in excruciating detail in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion,
which culminated in the rape and shooting of five people, one
of whom survived to recount the horrific tale.
The Kansas Supreme Court vacated the sentences after find-
ing that the Eighth Amendment requires sentencing courts to
instruct juries that mitigating circumstances need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Scalia, however, wrote that
the Constitution requires no such thing. He concluded that
whether mitigating circumstances exist “is largely a judgment
call (or perhaps a value call),” rather than a factual determina-
tion amenable to a burden-of-proof determination, so a reason-
able-doubt instruction would only confuse the jury.81
The Kansas Supreme Court also found that the Carrs’ joint
capital-sentencing proceeding violated their constitutional
right to an individualized sentencing determination. Again, the
majority disagreed. Reginald argued that he was prejudiced by
Jonathan’s portrayal of him as the corrupting older brother and
Jonathan’s presentation of testimony from their sister that
tended to show that Reginald, not Jonathan, was the shooter.
Jonathan contended that the joint sentencing proceeding
caused the jury to unfairly associate him with his dangerous
older brother. Analyzing the issue under the Due Process
Clause, the Court found that any evidentiary unfairness during
the joint sentencing phase did not rise to the level of a consti-
tutional violation.82
Justice Sotomayor wrote a
lone dissent, in which she argued
that the Court never should have
taken these cases, where Kansas
merely overprotected the consti-
tutional rights of its citizens,
something states are permitted to
do with state law, if they so
choose. She criticized the major-
ity for unnecessarily cutting off
state experimentation by opining
on the best way for states to pro-
vide individual rights, “without
any empirical foundation or any basis in experience.” Leaving
the states alone to experiment, she noted, “is particularly
important in the criminal arena because state courts preside
over many millions more criminal cases than their federal
counterparts.” We would like to point out that Justice
Sotomayor is the only sitting justice with experience in a state
criminal-justice system.83
In the second Eighth Amendment case, Montgomery v.
Louisiana,84 the Court found that the rule announced in Miller v.
Alabama applies retroactively on state collateral review. In 1963,
when Henry Montgomery was 17 years old, he killed a deputy
sheriff and received a mandatory life sentence without parole.85
This would not lawfully happen today, since the Court in 2012
announced in Miller v. Alabama86 that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits states from imposing mandatory life without parole on
juveniles. Miller required sentencing courts to consider the
diminished culpability and high capacity for change of youth
offenders before imposing a life sentence. It also noted that life
sentences for juveniles should be “uncommon.”87 In Mont-
gomery, the Court clarified that the Constitution requires this
rule to apply even to cold cases like Montgomery’s.
The Court in Montgomery announced that “when a new
substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of
a case, the Constitution requires state collateral review courts
to give retroactive effect to that rule.”88 Substantive, as
opposed to procedural, rules are those that “set forth categori-
cal constitutional guarantees that place certain criminal laws
and punishments altogether beyond the State’s power to
impose.”89 The majority reasoned that the Miller rule is sub-
stantive in that it “rendered life without parole an unconstitu-
tional penalty for ‘a class of defendants because of their [juve-
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nile] status.’” The rule therefore
applies retroactively.90 The
Court, however, assured states
that they “may remedy a Miller
violation by permitting juvenile
homicide offenders to be con-
sidered for parole, rather than
by resentencing them.”91
In his last dissent in a crimi-
nal case, Justice Scalia argued
that the decision of whether to
revisit an already-finalized conviction is entirely within the
State’s control—the Constitution, he said, does not have an
opinion either way.92 Justice Thomas wrote separately to
emphasize that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case in
the first place because it did not implicate any federal right.93
The third Eighth Amendment case, Lynch,94 was a per
curiam decision reversing the Arizona Supreme Court, which
had upheld the death penalty for Shawn Patrick Lynch. At
Lynch’s penalty-phase hearing, the State suggested that the
jury should impose death because Lynch could be dangerous
in the future. To rebut this argument, defense counsel asked
the trial court to inform the jury that Lynch was ineligible for
parole under Arizona law, but the court refused. The Supreme
Court found that this violated Simmons v. South Carolina,
which held that:
Where the State puts the defendant’s future dangerous-
ness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence
to death is life imprisonment without possibility of
parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the
capital sentencing jury—by either argument or instruc-
tion—that he is parole ineligible.95
The high court in Arizona mistakenly thought that Simmons
did not apply because, under state law, Lynch could have
received a life sentence with eligibility for “release” after 25
years. The per curiam opinion notes, however, that because
Lynch only would have been eligible for executive clemency,
not parole, Lynch was entitled to the instruction on parole
ineligibility. 
In dissent, Justices Thomas and Alito criticized the majority
for “such ‘micromanage[ment of] state sentencing proceed-
ings.’”96 They were skeptical that knowing the current state of
the law on parole would impact a jury’s decision to impose a
death sentence. They also found the per curiam decision “a
remarkably aggressive use of [the Court’s] power to review the
States’ highest courts,” particularly given that Simmons was “a
fractured decision of this Court that did not produce a major-
ity opinion.”97 Justice Scalia, who passed away before the
Lynch opinion came down, had dissented in Simmons.98 We
might assume that, had he been alive when Lynch came down,
he would have joined Justices Thomas and Alito or authored
his own dissent.
DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION
The Court decided the year’s most significant Due Process
and Equal Protection Clause decisions without Justice Scalia.
In Williams v. Pennsylvania,99 the Court clarified and expanded
its standard for when the Due Process Clause requires a judge
to recuse herself from a case. And in Foster v. Chatman,100 the
Court found that Georgia prosecutors were motivated by dis-
criminatory purpose in striking black jurors from a death-
penalty case. The Court also delivered a summary reversal.
In Williams, Justice Kennedy, writing for a five-justice
majority, stated that where a judge has had “significant, per-
sonal involvement in a critical trial decision” regarding the
defendant’s case, the Due Process Clause requires the judge’s
recusal.101 Terrance Williams murdered Amos Norwood in
Philadelphia in 1984. At that time, Ronald Castille was the dis-
trict attorney, and he gave his approval for the line prosecutor
to seek the death penalty against Williams. Williams was con-
victed and sentenced to death.
In 2012, Williams challenged his sentence in a post-convic-
tion petition, claiming that the line prosecutor at his murder
trial had violated Brady. That court stayed Williams’s execu-
tion and granted him a new sentencing hearing. The Com-
monwealth appealed. By this time, former District Attorney
Castille was the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Over defense counsel’s objection, he joined the rest of
that court in overturning the lower court’s decision and rein-
stating the death penalty in Williams’s case. 
A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
Williams’s due-process rights were violated when Chief Justice
Castille refused to recuse himself from the Commonwealth’s
appeal. Justice Kennedy reasoned that “[w]hen a judge has
served as an advocate for the State in the very case the court is
now asked to adjudicate, a serious question arises as to
whether the judge, even with the most diligent effort, could set
aside any personal interest in the outcome.”102 According to
the Court, Chief Justice Castille made a critical decision in
Williams’s case by authorizing the prosecutor to pursue the
death penalty, and that choice was significant in that, without
his express authorization, the prosecutor would not have been
able to seek the death penalty. Thus, Chief Justice Castille’s
previous involvement in the case created an “unacceptable risk
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of actual bias” that “so endangered the appearance of neutral-
ity that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’”103
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, dissented, as
he did in the Court’s last major due-process recusal case,
Caperton v. Massey (there joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito).104 They would rather leave it “up to state authori-
ties—not this Court—to determine whether recusal should be
required.”105 Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in
Williams, arguing that the majority opinion should have dis-
tinguished the due-process rights of criminal defendants from
those of parties in post-conviction proceedings.106
A few points are particularly worth noting. First, the major-
ity held that “an unconstitutional failure to recuse constitutes
structural error even if the judge in question did not cast a
deciding vote.”107 Thus, there is a due-process issue even if the
offending judge served on a unanimous panel and even, seem-
ingly, if the judge voted in the complaining party’s favor. 
Second, the majority did not limit itself to death-penalty
cases or invoke the Eighth Amendment. The holding therefore
appears to apply to any significant personal involvement a
judge has had in any critical trial decision, not just in decisions
in capital cases. 
Third, this case could have an interesting impact on how
former prosecutors make decisions about whether to recuse.
While “[m]ost questions of recusal are addressed by more
stringent and detailed ethical rules, which in many jurisdic-
tions already require disqualification under the circumstances
of this case,”108 Williams makes clear that these rules have con-
stitutional dimensions.
The eight-justice Court decided Chatman109 in May 2016 in
an opinion Chief Justice Roberts assigned to himself. The
Court first determined that the Georgia habeas court’s applica-
tion of res judicata principles to Timothy Foster’s Batson claim
was not independent of the merits of that claim; the justices
could therefore review the Batson issue.110 The Court then
found that state prosecutors were motivated by discriminatory
intent when they used their peremptory strikes to remove all
the prospective black jurors from Foster’s death-penalty case,
which violates the Equal Protection Clause.111
Foster supported his Batson case with an array of docu-
ments he obtained pursuant to a state open-records request,
including the jury-venire list, which showed that each black
prospective juror’s name was highlighted and notated with a
“B.” On each of the juror questionnaires, the juror’s response
indicating his or her race was circled. Foster also received a
draft affidavit prepared by the
state’s investigator at the prose-
cutor’s request, in which the
investigator wrote: “If it comes
down to having to pick one of
the black jurors, [this one]
might be okay” under one of
the black prospective juror’s
names. Foster received hand-
written notes on three black
prospective jurors, which
referred to those jurors as
“B#1,” “B#2,” and “B#3,” and a
handwritten list titled “definite
NO’s” that included all of the
black prospective jurors’ names. Another handwritten docu-
ment titled “Church of Christ” included a notation that read:
“NO. No Black Church.”112
Although the prosecutors presented alternative reasons for
why they struck each of the black prospective jurors, the Court
rejected these justifications, noting the State’s “shifting expla-
nations, the misrepresentation of the record, and the persistent
focus on race.”113 “[T]he focus on race in the prosecution’s file
plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospec-
tive jurors off the jury.”114
Justice Alito wrote separately to assert that the state court
on remand could still reject Foster’s claim on state habeas
grounds.115 Dissenting, Justice Thomas accused the majority of
“[in]adequately grappling with the possibility that we lack
jurisdiction,” as it was unclear from the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s summary order whether it based its opinion on state
or federal law.116 “The Court today imposes an opinion-writing
requirement on the States’ highest courts.”117
In its per curiam decision in Wearry v. Cain,118 the Court
summarily reversed a Louisiana post-conviction court due to a
Brady violation. Michael Wearry had been convicted and sen-
tenced to death for murder in rural Louisiana in 1998. No
physical evidence connected Wearry to the murder, and the
prosecution built its case on inmate witnesses. But it later
became clear that the prosecution failed to disclose material
evidence that would have undercut the witnesses’ credibility.
The Court found that under settled constitutional principles,
this undermined confidence in the jury verdict and therefore
violated Wearry’s due-process rights. The state court erred by
evaluating the materiality of each piece of evidence individu-
ally, rather than cumulatively.119 Justices Alito and Thomas dis-
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sented. Although there was
“no question” that the prose-
cution should have disclosed
the information, they were
not sure that disclosure
would have affected the ver-
dict and thus disfavored a
summary reversal.120
SECOND AMENDMENT
The justices decided one
Second Amendment case, Cae-
tano v. Massachusetts,121 summarily reversing the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts court had found
that the Second Amendment does not protect stun guns for sev-
eral reasons, including that stun guns were not in common use
at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment and are not
readily adaptable to military use. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected these reasons as inconsistent with the holding in District
of Columbia v. Heller122 and remanded for further proceedings.123
Justices Alito and Thomas concurred, providing a much more
critical review of the state court’s holding.124
TIDBITS
The Court also decided a series of federal criminal cases and
issued a summary reversal in a habeas case, that, for our pur-
poses, are worth a brief mention.
In a closely watched case, McDonnell v. United States,125 the
Court unanimously reversed the federal criminal conviction of
the former Governor of Virginia, Bob McDonnell. The key part
of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of what amounts to
a proscribed “official act” within the meaning of the federal
bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. The justices rejected an
expansive construction, ruling that that merely hosting an
event or meeting with others is not enough. Rather, the public
official must make a decision or take an action on the matter
by doing something specific and focused, such as deciding an
issue or exerting pressure on another official to do so.126
Another case of interest is Voisine v. United States,127 where
the Court ruled 6-2 that a federal law barring a person con-
victed of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from
possessing a firearm includes convictions for reckless conduct.
The majority found no indication in the text, background, or
history of the statute that the firearms ban should be limited to
knowing or intentional conduct. “And the state-law backdrop”
to the federal statute, “which included misdemeanor assault
statutes covering reckless conduct in a significant majority of
jurisdictions, indicates that Congress meant just what it
said.”128
Welch v. United States129 is a sequel to last Term’s decision in
Johnson v. United States,130 where the justices ruled that the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(e)(B)(ii), was unconstitutionally vague. In
Welch, the Court determined that the rule announced in John-
son is substantive and thus applies retroactively to cases on col-
lateral review under the framework set forth in Teague v.
Lane.131
The summary reversal came in White v. Wheeler,132 where
the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, as it has often done as of
late.133 The Sixth Circuit had granted habeas relief on Due
Process and Sixth Amendment grounds in a death-penalty case
where the Kentucky trial court had dismissed a juror for giv-
ing equivocal and inconsistent answers as to whether he could
impose the death penalty. The Court found that the lower
court misapplied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which requires deference to the state
courts. The Court communicated its apparent exasperation
with the Sixth Circuit: “this Court again advises the Court of
Appeals that the provisions of AEDPA apply with full force
even when reviewing a conviction and sentence imposing the
death penalty.”134
TWO COURTS, AND A LOOK AHEAD
We have suggested that the 2015-2016 Term had two
Courts, one with Justice Antonin Scalia and one without. With
such a private governmental entity, it is difficult to assess how
his passing affected the remaining justices’ decision making.
His death would not likely have changed the outcomes of any
criminal cases decided in the second half of the Term. Yet his
was such a strong voice that it is difficult to imagine the opin-
ions not being shaped by him in some way. And there is always
the possibility, nay, probability, that the justices decided the
cases as they did to avoid a 4-4 tie.
The 2016-2017 Term is now underway, with a number of
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important criminal-law cases on the docket. For starters, Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado135 will examine whether evidence of
racial bias may be used to impeach a jury’s verdict. And Moore
v. Texas136 will explore whether it violates the Eighth Amend-
ment to prohibit the use of current medical standards on intel-
lectual disability in determining whether a person may be exe-
cuted. But the most important question for the coming Term is
whom President-elect Trump will nominate to fill the seat of
the late Justice Antonin Scalia.
Charles D. Weisselberg is Shannon C. Turner
Professor of Law at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley. He teaches criminal procedure,
criminal law, and other subjects. 
Juliana DeVries is a J.D. candidate at Berkeley
Law in the class of 2017. Following graduation,
she will be clerking on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Child-custody evaluations have become commonplace infamily-law disputes over living arrangements, parentaldecision making, and time-sharing with offspring. A
quarter century ago, I raised the issue that child-custody eval-
uations had no scientific validity.1 When I reviewed the litera-
ture again a decade ago, the lack of scientific validity remained
unchanged, prompting me to bring the issue directly to the
readership of this journal.2 Unfortunately, even today’s promi-
nent proponents of child-custody evaluations admit that at the
present time there is still no scientific evidence whatsoever that
a child-custody evaluation results in beneficial outcomes for
the children involved.3
In light of the above, it is reasonable to ask: Why are child-
custody evaluations ordered with regularity when there is no sci-
entific evidence to support them? There are a variety of reasons. 
First, it is rational and fair to expect mental-health experts
to be more capable at rearranging families than judges; after
all, the latter are not trained as psychologists or psychiatrists,
and in the quest to make these critical decisions correctly, it is
prudent to look to experts for advice. However, this assump-
tion comes into question because there is no scientific evi-
dence proving that mental-health professionals are better at
making child-custody decisions than judges. In fact, there is no
scientific evidence that mental-health professionals are better
at making child-custody decisions than anyone, be they pro-
fessionals, laypersons, or otherwise.
Second, while mental-health experts are duty-bound to pro-
vide their best advice when called upon, they do not seem to
be emphasizing to the judiciary that there is no scientific evi-
dence for their custody-evaluation recommendations. After all,
if that were emphasized, their testimony might well be pre-
cluded based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and pertinent
Supreme Court decisions (e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.4). Further, the lack of scientific validity has not
deterred professional organizations such as the American Psy-
chological Association (APA) from issuing guidelines for how
to conduct these evaluations5 or smaller groups offering “cer-
tification” (e.g., Professional Academy of Custody Evaluators)
based on less-than-stellar credentials.6 Such offerings by pro-
fessional organizations encourage the use of child-custody
evaluations despite the absence of proper scientific substantia-
tion for them. Guidelines and certification are no substitute for
scientific evidence.
Third, while custody evaluators undoubtedly perform these
examinations with a sense of professional duty, they also have
a significant financial interest in conducting them. Some stud-
ies report custody-evaluation fees to be in the thousands of
dollars,7 and in highly contested matters it is not uncommon
to see tens of thousands of dollars spent on these evaluations.8
As will be shown below, when parents are ordered into these
costly evaluations in the absence of scientific evidence to
determine if, when, and how they should be conducted, it cre-
ates a context in which custody evaluators have considerable
discretion, leading some to implement extensive psychological
assessments of family members and thereby spend the family’s
money in a way the court likely never imagined. Since there is
no scientific evidence whatsoever that a more thorough evalu-
ation leads to a better outcome for children, these families are
forced to pay for a costly evaluation and opinion that may very
well be incorrect. Those benefiting financially from these eval-
uations may not wish to see courts discontinue ordering them.
Financial interests aside, there is no doubt that what under-
lies the promotion of child-custody evaluations is the assump-
tion held by the judiciary, custody evaluators, and pertinent
professional organizations that performance of these examina-
tions is in the best interest of children. Unfortunately, this
assumption has no body of scientific evidence to prove it and
appears more consistent with wishful thinking. Clearly, an over-
burdened judiciary would benefit greatly by having highly
skilled professionals ready to perform child-custody evalua-
tions that are strongly supported by a comprehensive body of
scientific findings.
Since there is no direct scientific evidence proving that cus-
tody evaluations benefit children, is it possible that custody
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evaluations might not benefit children? Taken a step further:
might child-custody evaluations cause detrimental effects for
the children involved?
At first glance, the idea that child-custody evaluations could
potentially be harmful to children would seem inconsistent
with the Zeitgeist. However, upon further consideration, there
are several facts supporting the viability of the hypothesis that
child-custody evaluations may indeed prove detrimental. 
WHY CHILD-CUSTODY EVALUATIONS MAY BE 
DETRIMENTAL
The first consideration as to why child-custody evaluations
may be detrimental is that there is no scarcity of past partici-
pants claiming them to be. Not only are such claims made reg-
ularly in pleadings and attorneys’ offices, a perusal of the Inter-
net reveals no shortage of individuals opposed to these evalu-
ations. It is easy to dismiss such complaints as the conse-
quence of “sour grapes,” but without proper scientific investi-
gation, it is unknown what percentage of these custody-evalu-
ation grievances have legitimacy.
Second, there is no doubt that these financially burdensome
evaluations deplete a certain percentage of a family’s financial
resources, especially at a time when funds are being drained by
the formal reorganization of the family. One of the more dis-
turbing examples of such a financial assault was noted by the
Second District Court of Appeal of Florida in 2003 where it
was reported that one psychologist charged an amount equal to
the parties’ entire net worth ($20,000), leading the appellate
court to question how it could be in a child’s best interest for
the family’s resources to be depleted by such fees.9 This is
especially concerning given that scientific research has shown
that an important predictor of how well children adjust to
divorce is economic stability, a key variable in light of the drain
caused by dividing a family into two households.10 Clearly, if a
mental-health professional wipes out a family’s entire net
worth for an opinion that has no demonstrated beneficial value
of major significance, this certainly would appear harmful to
the children involved. In fact, any substantial dent in a family’s
resources due to a custody evaluation that produces little if any
proven benefit for the family would certainly not be in the best
interest of the children.
A third reason supporting the hypothesis that child-custody
evaluations may be detrimental can be seen in the aftermath of
the custody evaluator’s declared opinion. Since there is no sci-
entific evidence to support the opinion as correct or not, costly
decisions may be made by the family on what may be erro-
neous professional recommendations. Some may feel no choice
but to commit more family funds to attack or defend a report
that may be incorrect and perhaps detrimental. Others may
succumb to the custody evalua-
tor’s recommendations to avoid
further expense, even though
these may be wrong and ulti-
mately prove harmful to their
children. Even correct recom-
mendations might prove to be a
detriment if the court feels it
must dismiss them on grounds of
inadequate scientific validity,
thereby resulting only in another
costly expenditure for the family. Thus, in the absence of
strong scientific evidence, a correct set of recommendations
and incorrect set may both produce detrimental effects for
families.
A fourth reason to suggest that child-custody evaluations
may prove deleterious can be found in the scientific literature
on the effects of psychotherapy.11 Over the decades, substantial
scientific evidence has accumulated showing that a significant
percentage of patients are actually harmed by psychotherapy.12
Put another way, it is a well-established scientific fact that in
their efforts to be helpful, mental-health professionals actually
harm a subset of their patients. While not widely publicized, the
interested reader will find a substantial body of scientific
research available documenting iatrogenic effects of psy-
chotherapy. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that
such efforts “to help”—in the form of providing child-custody
evaluations—may prove harmful to some as well.
Fifth, there is substantial scientific evidence that diagnostic
errors in healthcare are common, creating serious negative
consequences and costing billions of dollars.13 In medicine,
objective assessment tools are readily available (e.g., blood test,
MRI, etc.), yet diagnostic errors occur with regularity, produc-
ing serious consequences. In contrast, the assessment tools of
mental-health professionals (including those used by child-
custody evaluators) are certainly less objective. The determi-
nation of whether a blood-sugar level is too low or high is far
more straightforward than determining how to optimally
rearrange a family’s time together, how decision making should
occur on items like school choice and extracurricular activi-
ties, how to structure two-household living arrangements, and
how to address other multi-factorial issues that are part and
parcel of child-custody evaluators’ recommendations. Armed
with less objective assessment tools to examine the consider-
ably more complex issues found in mental-health practice, it is
not surprising that the rate of misdiagnosing psychiatric disor-
ders is alarming.14 In fact, diagnostic error is so problematic
that the Chairperson of the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), psychia-
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App. 2003).
10. Robert E. Emery, Randy K. Otto & William T. O’Donoghue, A
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PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 53 (2007). 
13. Ali S. Saber Tehrani, HeeWon Lee, Simon C. Matthews, Andrew
Shore, Martin A. Makary, Peter J. Pronovost & David E. Newman-
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trist Allen Frances of Duke Uni-
versity School of Medicine,
declared that the current version
of the diagnostic manual (DSM-
5)—the most widely used com-
pendium of criteria for psychi-
atric disorders—“includes scien-
tifically unfounded, inadequately
tested, and potentially dangerous
diagnoses,”15 resulting in millions
of patients labeled incorrectly as
suffering from mental disorders.16 The problem of diagnostic
error is well illustrated in DSM-5 research field trials, which
revealed a significant failure in evaluators’ ability to reliably
agree on numerous psychiatric diagnoses, prompting DSM-IV
Chairperson Frances to declare, “The results of the DSM-5 field
trials are a disgrace to the field.”17
Chairperson Frances’ scathing criticism of the scientifically
problematic psychiatric diagnoses contained in DSM-5 was
echoed by no less than the Director of the National Institute of
Mental Health, Thomas Insel, who confirmed that the DSM-5’s
“weakness is its lack of validity.”18
Given the problem mental-health practitioners have in
making reliable and valid diagnoses combined with the docu-
mented history of harming therapy patients they set out to
help, it would seem likely that scientifically unsupported cus-
tody evaluations are not immune from these very same serious
deficiencies. Clearly, assigning a psychiatric diagnosis is a far
less complex task than figuring out an entire family’s best
arrangements for the future of children’s lives. As such, it
seems reasonable to expect evaluators to make errors when
examining complex matters like child custody, resulting in
negative outcomes.
Finally, scientific evidence that privacy intrusion can be
stressful has been known for decades.19 In heated custody bat-
tles, it is not uncommon for highly sensitive and deeply per-
sonal information obtained from a minor by a custody evalua-
tor to be revealed to parents. On occasion, such content may
stimulate damaging interactions among family members. The
negative impact upon the individuals so affected has not been
studied scientifically, but recent scientific studies show that
privacy invasion in families can negatively affect the child-par-
ent relationship.20 In light of the significant privacy intrusion
and forced disclosure that children and parents may endure as
participants in custody evaluations, it is reasonable to expect
potential detrimental effects. 
In sum, when one considers the lack of scientific evidence
to support custody evaluations, the diagnostic-error rate
among mental-health professionals, the harmful effects psy-
chotherapists unintentionally cause patients, the impact of
financial burden caused by custody evaluations, and the psy-
chological damage that privacy invasion may generate, the
hypothesis that child-custody evaluations may produce detri-
mental effects seems viable.  
In light of the above, I recently searched the literature in
this regard and did not find even one research study aimed at
investigating the potential negative impact of child-custody
evaluations on the children these examinations aim to help.
The present article reports the first known quantitative data on
detrimental effects of child-custody evaluations.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Scientific investigation can be expensive. As such, initial
studies in an area typically are designed to be limited, straight-
forward, and cost-effective, operating under the assumption that
if useful results emerge, future studies will be more sophisticated
and produce reliable findings of greater clarity with increased
applicability. The present study was designed to be exploratory
and, as an initial investigation, is preliminary in nature.  
To preserve objectivity and subject anonymity, a nationally
recognized private research firm utilized by Harvard Univer-
sity, Stanford University, and other institutions was hired to
solicit and screen subjects, administer research questions, col-
lect data, and tally results.  
SUBJECTS
One hundred one individuals representing 66 metropolitan
areas across 35 states who met the following selection criteria
participated in the present study: (1) they indicated they were
divorced; (2) they reported they had participated in a child-
custody evaluation by a psychologist; (3) they presented
details requested about the custody evaluation; (4) they indi-
15. Allen Frances & Dayle K. Jones, Should Social Workers Use Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5?, 24 RES. SOC.
WORK PRAC. 11 (2014).
16. Allen Frances & Suzy Chapman, DSM-5 Somatic Symptom Disor-
der Mislabels Medical Illness as Mental Disorder, 47 AUSTL. & N. Z.
J. PSYCHIATRY 483 (2013).
17. Allen Frances, Newsflash from APA Meeting: DSM-5 Has Flunked
Its Reliability Tests, HUFFINGTON POST, May 8, 2012,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/allen-frances/dsm-5-reliability-
tests_b_1490857.html (emphasis added).
18. Thomas Insel, Director’s Blog: Transforming Diagnosis (April 29,
2013), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/trans
forming-diagnosis.shtml.
19. Carl I. Greenberg & Ira J. Firestone, Compensatory Responses to
Crowding: Effects of Personal Space Intrusion and Privacy Reduction,
35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 637 (1977); Stephen D. Webb,
Privacy and Psychosomatic Stress: An Empirical Analysis, 6 SOC.
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 227 (1978); T.G. Gutheil, Harold Bursztajn,
Archie Brodsky & Larry H. Strasburger, Preventing “Critogenic”
Harms: Minimizing Emotional Injury from Civil Litigation, 28 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (2000).
20. Ana M. Cruz, Managing Privacy Boundaries Between Parents and
Young-Adult Children: An Examination of the Relationship Between
Cultural Orientation, Family Communication, Family Satisfaction,
and Parental Intrusion, 68 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT’L SEC. A
4919 (2008); Skyler T. Hawk, Loes Keijsers, Tom Frijns, William
W. Hale III & Wim Meeus, Mind Your Own Business: Longitudinal
Relations Between Perceived Privacy Invasion and Adolescent-Parent
Conflict, 23 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 511 (2009); Skyler T. Hawk, Loes
Keijsers, Tom Frijns, William W. Hale III, Susan Branje & Wim
Meeus, “I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For”: Parental Pri-
vacy Invasion Predicts Reduced Parental Knowledge, 49 DEVELOP-
MENTAL PSYCHOL. 1286 (2013).
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cated the evaluation was paid for by family funds; and (5) they
were not related to any other study participant. No children
participated in the present investigation.
The subjects were equally divided in gender (49% female;
51% male). Age was distributed as follows: 34 years or younger
(28.7%); 35-44 (35.6%); 45-54 (20.8%); 55-64 (13.9%), and
65 or older (1%). In regard to subjects’ participation in a child-
custody evaluation, 94% reported doing so between 2000 and
2015; the remaining few did so before 2000. The highest cus-
tody-evaluation fee reported by subjects was $23,000. 
METHOD
Following an online identification and screening process,21
potential subjects were exposed to and answered only one
question at a time regarding aspects of their divorce history,
including experience participating in a child-custody evalua-
tion, until they either met all of the screening criteria or failed
to meet one of the criteria. Those failing to meet any one of the
screening criteria were removed immediately from the study,
and those meeting all of the screening criteria were then
administered the survey online. Subjects were chosen consec-
utively until the target number of participants was reached
with equal gender representation. No one who met all screen-
ing criteria was excluded from the study. Any subject who
failed to answer all of the required questions of the study was
excluded from the final subject pool. 
Following successful completion of the custody-evaluation-
history screening process, each of the participants were asked
three yes/no questions as to whether the recommendations of
the child-custody evaluator did or did not: (1) “have any nega-
tive effect on any of your children”; (2) “have any harmful effect
on the life of any of your children”; and (3) “make life worse for
any of your children.”
Participants were next asked, “Given what you know now, if
you could go back in time and take all the money that was spent
on the child custody evaluation and choose today how best to
spend that money for your children’s benefit, which statement
below do you agree with?” and were asked to choose one of the
following: (1) “My children would be better off if the money was
spent on the child custody evaluation” or (2) “My children would
be better off if the money was spent in other ways and not on the
child custody evaluation.”
Finally, participants were then invited (but not required) to
respond to the following open-ended statement: “Please tell us
anything else you would like us to know about the effects of the
child custody evaluation on any of your children.” 
RESULTS
The results of the present
study indicate that a remarkable
number of children experienced
negative effects and that lives
were made worse by the recom-
mendations of the custody eval-
uator, as reported by their par-
ents. As can be seen in in Figure
1, nearly one in four children
reportedly experienced negative
effects, and one in five were
reportedly harmed or lives were
made worse by the custody evaluators’ recommendations.
These findings are disturbing. However, they appear especially
problematic given that a stunning 65% of all parents in the pre-
sent study reported that their children would have been better
off if the money spent on the child-custody evaluation had not
been spent on it. Within that 65% were many parents not
reporting negative effects who still concluded that their chil-
dren would have been better served by the family not having
spent money on the child-custody evaluation. Thus, in addi-
tion to an alarming percentage of children reportedly being
harmed by child-custody evaluators’ recommendations, a
unique negative effect was found: approximately two-thirds of
all parents report that child-custody evaluations are not in the
financial best interest of their children.
Although not required, subjects were invited to respond to
an open request to present anything else about the effects of
the evaluation on their offspring they would like to, and 66%
of parents chose to volunteer their thoughts—suggesting a
population intrinsically motivated to share their child-cus-
tody-evaluation experiences. Of those who reported that the
custody evaluator’s recommendations produced negative
effects on their children, they related predictable complaints,
such as that the evaluator made a poor placement decision
(e.g., “Because of the evaluation my child resides with his mater-
nal grandparents and is miserable”; “[the evaluator] made my
daughter live with her mother, who is unfit and absentee”), cre-
ated a negative economic impact on the children (e.g., “The
21. The subject-recruitment-and-screening process utilized by the
independent research company is summarized as follows. Sub-
jects were invited to participate in a short survey as an entry to
desired premium content (e.g., e-book, movie, etc.) from a select
group of pre-screened online publishers with an established his-
tory of producing attentive, quality respondents. Participation
was purely voluntary, and no other reward (e.g., airline miles,
money, etc.) was offered to subjects for participation. Any subject
who failed the research company’s trademarked technology to
identify dishonest answers (e.g., response-pattern analysis,
including elimination of excessive-speed responders, “trap” ques-
tions with known answers such as “what time zone are you in?,”
etc.) was eliminated. Study participants were each assigned a
unique alphanumeric label; at no time did the present author
interact with any of the subjects that participated in the study or
receive any personally identifying information about them. For
additional information about the research firm utilized, please
contact the author.  
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF PARENTS REPLYING AFFIRMATIVELY
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cost of the evaluation was so high 
. . . it set back my ability to afford
the right things for my child.
Instead of doing traveling sports
and band it is no longer feasible
and I must work extra as well as
his mother so neither one of us see
our child much”), and demon-
strated unacceptable professional
performance (e.g., “the evaluator
spent little time with the child[,]
spent no alone time with the
child[,] and made life altering
decisions based on her feelings and not the facts”). In addition,
other subjects who reported that the custody evaluator’s rec-
ommendations produced negative effects on their children also
reported how the evaluation process stressed their offspring.
Examples:
It created tension in my children, them getting confused
on whom to support, me or her. Long and the short of it,
nothing good came out of it.
My kids knew what was going on, the purpose and rea-
son of the eval. It put them in the middle of the battle
between my ex-wife and I. It was emotionally draining
for them. They wanted it to be over.
It was an unnecessary tra[u]ma on my daughter, which
the court mandated.
Perhaps even more illuminating are the complaints volun-
teered by those who reported that the custody evaluator’s rec-
ommendations did not have negative effects on their children.
Consistent with the data reported above, the evaluators were
criticized over the cost of the child-custody evaluation (e.g., “It
really didn’t do anything one way or another other than a loss of
funds used to pay for it” and “waste of money//could of taken the
kids shopping for clothes shoes//spent on a vacation//bought the
children food/hygiene products anything they may have needed”).
In addition, a subset of parents who did not report negative
effects on the children did attack the usefulness and value of
the custody evaluation. For example:
It didn’t really have an effect. It pretty much told us what
we already knew so the money would have been better
spent on my daughter.
It is just a big hassle for the child involved and stirs up
more emotions.
It took too much time, and effort, and had to explain
questions, that my child did not need to know at the
time.
The evaluation did not have much merit in court
because the judge said it sounded “biased” even though
it was based off scientific metrics.
Taken as a whole, the results of the present study reveal
child-custody evaluations are rejected by the majority of par-
ents as not in their children’s financial best interest, and a wor-
risome number report negative and harmful effects of these
evaluations on their children. Clearly, the parents in the pre-
sent study provide disturbing appraisals of the child-custody
evaluations they participated in around the country.
ADVICE FOR THE JUDICIARY
The results of the present study question the assumption that
child-custody evaluations are in the best interest of children.
The data herein demonstrate that almost one in four children
experienced negative effects from these evaluations, including
parental reports of harm and children’s lives made worse in one
in five cases. Further, two-thirds of parents did not feel child-
custody examinations are in their children’s best financial inter-
est; looking back, they oppose spending money on these evalu-
ations. The results of the present study should trigger alarms
when a motion for a child-custody evaluation is heard. 
For the first time, the judiciary now has some quantitative
information about the effects of child-custody evaluations.
Unfortunately, these initial data suggest custody evaluations
may harm children. Most parents reject these evaluations as
financially unworthy. The data raise serious concerns. 
In regard to the individual case before the bench, the results
of the present study suggest the court should appreciate that
any order for a child-custody evaluation may potentially lead
to damaging the children the court is trying to protect. Ironi-
cally, the present data imply the court may need to protect chil-
dren in custody battles from the custody evaluators.
The notion that children in custody battles may need pro-
tection from custody evaluators comes not just from the pre-
sent study demonstrating a worrisome percentage of children
reportedly being harmed and parents reporting these evalua-
tions as not in the children’s financial best interest, but by a
consideration of common courtroom practices. Before the pre-
sent study, given the absence of any scientific evidence what-
soever to support the utilization of child-custody evaluations,
the decision to order such an evaluation was based on two key
assumptions: (1) the evaluation would be helpful for the chil-
dren; and (2) the bench would rely primarily on the credentials
of the evaluator as a guarantor of an accurate and cost-effective
custody evaluation. Unfortunately, the present results show
that children can be hurt by these evaluations and that parents
view these evaluations as cost-ineffective, with children better
off without them. Further, reliance on the evaluator’s creden-
tials is flawed as well.22 One can have outstanding credentials,
but that does not guarantee accurate or cost-effective child-
custody-evaluation recommendations.  
Indeed, most family courts these days would welcome as a
custody evaluator someone who had served as a psychology
22. See Turkat, supra note 1.
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professor at a major university and as the elected President of
the American Board of Forensic Psychology (the longstanding
certification authority in its area recognized by the APA),
authored numerous peer-reviewed articles pertinent to custody
evaluations (including joint publication with a law professor),
evaluated over 2,000 cases, and served as a court-appointed
guardian ad litem and special master. These are in fact the cre-
dentials of University of Washington Clinical Associate Profes-
sor Stuart Greenberg:
[H]e evaluated more than 2,000 children, teenagers and
adults. His word could determine which parent received
custody of a child . . . . But his formidable career was
built upon a foundation of hypocrisy and lies. In the
years since Greenberg’s death . . . The Seattle Times
worked to unearth Greenberg’s secrets, getting court
records unsealed and disciplinary records opened. Those
records are a testament to Greenberg’s cunning. They
show how he played the courts for a fool. He played state
regulators for a fool. He played his fellow psychologists
for a fool. And were it not for a hidden camera, he might
have gotten away with it. . . .
[A]s a custody investigator, expert evaluator, arbiter,
mediator, guardian ad litem, special master[, he] became
enmeshed in the court system, buddying up to lawyers,
judges, fellow experts. On the stand, he radiated confi-
dence. “He was just kind of a notch above the rest of us,”
says Nick Wiltz, a fellow forensic psychologist. “He was
able to present reports and information in a very power-
ful way.” . . . He published in peer-reviewed journals and
spoke all over the country. . . . His peers elected him
president of the American Board of Forensic Psychology.
. . . His fees in individual cases were known to climb
from $8,000 to $12,000 to $20,000 or more.23
Empowered by top-notch credentials and reputation in an
area lacking scientific validity, Greenberg engaged in highly
unethical behavior, abused his clients and employees, duped
the courts about cases (e.g., misused and misrepresented test
and interview data, including manipulating a custody recom-
mendation to favor a convicted domestic-violence offender rep-
resented by legal counsel who was Greenberg’s undisclosed
business partner, while falsely presenting the assault victim as
significantly disturbed mentally and posing a danger to her off-
spring), secretly videotaped individuals in his office bathroom
for his own private gratification, and despite having been found
guilty of violating his license to
practice earlier in his career,
Greenberg was so cunning he was
able to force his disciplinary
records to be sealed so as not to
interfere in his future practices as
a forensic psychologist.24 In 2007,
Greenberg was caught gratifying
himself in front of the very camera
he used to spy on others in his office bathroom and shortly
thereafter committed suicide.25
Had it not been for the discovery of that camera, Greenberg
might still be operating today as a prominent, highly desired
custody evaluator.
Greenberg’s case undoubtedly would not apply to most cus-
tody evaluators, but it illustrates the serious flaws in how these
evaluations are assigned, implemented, and utilized. Relying
primarily on credentials is risky when there is no scientific evi-
dence to guide the court. 
In light of this dilemma and considering the results of the
present study, the bench would do well to stay focused on the
need for strong scientific support before authorizing well-
intentioned professionals to perform potentially harmful child-
custody evaluations or unwittingly empowering potentially
harmful evaluators. At present, ordering a child-custody eval-
uation is a gamble, in terms of the evaluator, the evaluation,
and the potential for harm to children. As Greenberg illus-
trated in today’s poor level of science that forces the bench to
be dependent on its faith in the evaluator performing a child-
custody evaluation, it comes with a heavy wager: an evaluator
you place your faith in may take a family down a terrible path
you might not even know about until after the damage is done.
Put another way: if the highly observed President of the Amer-
ican Board of Forensic Psychology can “play the courts for a
fool,”26 what prevents the less-scrutinized custody evaluator
before you from doing so? Today’s poor level of science on
child-custody evaluations offers the judiciary no protection.
Considering the results herein more globally, the judiciary
may wish to take a very hard look at the practice of ordering
child-custody evaluations to determine how they serve the
needs of families. More specifically, a greater push should be
made by the judiciary to encourage local psychologists and the
APA to begin systematic scientific research on child-custody
evaluations27 to develop a set of proven tools that properly
serves families. Over the last quarter century, psychology has
failed to do so. If the judiciary halted child-custody evaluations
23. Karen Armstrong & Maureen O’Hagan, Seattle Times Special
Report: Twisted Ethics of an Expert Witness, SEATTLE TIMES, June 26,
2011, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-times-
special-report-twisted-ethics-of-an-expert-witness/. 
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. From a scientific perspective, the results of the present study call
for the development of clearly delineated facts on the positive and
negative outcomes of child-custody evaluations utilizing well-
designed research investigations of far greater sophistication than
the initial survey herein, which naturally comes with limitations.
Scientifically useful retrospective and cross-sectional studies
would certainly be helpful, but, ultimately, prospective investiga-
tions are required to demonstrate the long-term effects of child-
custody-evaluation recommendations, using well-chosen repre-
sentative populations of ample size. With a comprehensive body
of scientific facts on custody evaluation and outcome, including
direct assessment of the functioning of children in addition to
other measures such as parental report (the sole dependent vari-
able in the present study), evaluators would then have a legiti-
mate scientific foundation to properly advise the courts, which is
lacking at the present time.
At present,
ordering a 
child-custody
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until there is strong scientific evidence for how to perform
them in ways that achieve better outcomes for children, psy-
chologists would likely rise to the challenge. Without such a
halt, the experience of the last quarter century as noted above
is at risk to continue as is. Maintaining the status quo is cer-
tainly not in the best interest of families litigating over custody
of their children.
As child-custody evaluations have been performed for
decades under the assumption that it is in the best interest of
children—an assumption seriously challenged by the results
of the present investigation and the factors reviewed herein, it
is hoped that future research will help create evaluations that
serve children well and outweigh any negative effects, includ-
ing the crippling cost some families have experienced. Given
the design of the present study, one should look to the results
of future, more sophisticated scientific investigations to better
identify the types of negative effects that child-custody evalu-
ations may produce, their prevalence, and how they can be
prevented.
Since at the present time there is no scientific evidence
whatsoever that child-custody evaluations benefit children
while the quantitative information presented in the present
article indicates these evaluations may harm them, at mini-
mum, it is advisable for the judiciary to become far more cau-
tious when a motion for a child-custody evaluation is heard. At
maximum, one could well argue that, at the present time, fam-
ilies may be better off without child-custody evaluations.
Dr. Turkat advises family-law attorneys on
child-custody disputes. A licensed psychologist,
he has served on the faculty at Vanderbilt Uni-
versity School of Medicine and University of
Florida College of Medicine. In 2011, the
50,000-member British Psychological Society
named him alongside three of the world’s most
outstanding clinical psychologists in history for
their influential work on case formulation; Dr. Turkat is the only
American named among the four. Address all correspondence to:
Ira Daniel Turkat, Ph.D., 2015 South Tuttle Avenue, Sarasota,
Florida 34239; Telephone (941) 488-8093.
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We welcome the opportunity to respond to Dr.Turkat’s article, Harmful Effects of Child-CustodyEvaluations on Children. We believe that there are
many flaws and unsubstantiated claims made by Dr. Turkat,
and we challenge his primary thesis that child-custody evalua-
tions are, by definition, harmful.
Dr. Turkat sets the tone in his first paragraph with his
sweeping statements that “child-custody evaluations [have] no
scientific validity” and “there is still no scientific evidence
whatsoever that a child-custody evaluation results in beneficial
outcomes for the children involved.” His article includes too
many generalized, unsupported charges to allow it to pass
without challenge. We hope that our comments will contribute
to more informed discussion clarifying misunderstandings
about the role and value of custody evaluations and how they
should properly be introduced into court proceedings.
OUTRAGEOUS ALLEGATIONS WITH NO SUPPORT
Our first concern with these opening statements of Dr.
Turkat, and his paper in general, is his assumption that foren-
sic psychologists and the courts have not responded to
Daubert1 and its progeny and that psychologists continue to
pontificate in the absence of sound research support, charging
outrageous sums of money for their services. This is not the
case. Even in the non-Daubert states and in Canada,2 expert
evidence has come increasingly under the microscope to
ensure opinions have scientific support. The National Acad-
emy of Sciences provides an excellent treatise for forensic, psy-
chological, and other professional examiners. 
In addition, professional organizations (federal, state, and
provincial) have made explicitly clear to psychologists, as well
as other forensic experts, the need to adhere to scientifically
supported evidence. Furthermore, forensic psychologists must
ensure the “scientific support” they are offering in support of
their opinions is, in fact, robust, replicated, and well-recog-
nized research. 
IMPORTANCE OF PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE BROUGHT INTO THE
COURTROOM
Our second concern is that Turkat’s statements are too
broad to be meaningful. We agree that there is no empirical
research examining which residential arrangements are best for
which children. Authors of current peer-reviewed literature
proposing developmentally appropriate parenting arrange-
ments extrapolate from empirically based child-developmental
research to craft age-appropriate parenting plans.3 The reader
is directed to a 2014 article by Dr. Linda Nielsen, Woozles:
Their Role in Custody Law Reform, Parenting Plans and Family
Court. Dr. Nielsen describes how research data can often be
distorted and manipulated to support an erroneous view of
what is really demonstrated by the literature. “Woozles,” or
beliefs based on inaccurate data, have been particularly present
in family court, where they can reinforce value judgements on
what is best for children.4
There are many excellent examples of both legal and foren-
sic-psychological interest in developing better understanding
of scientific evidence in the courtroom. There are many exam-
ples of recent legal publications providing guidance both to the
bench as well as to the forensic expert on the need for speci-
ficity in the relevance of forensic research to the issues before
the court.5 Faigman et al., writing in The University of Chicago
Law Review, provide an excellent review of how the forensic
examiner applies research data, based on groups, to the spe-
cific individual(s) before the court in meeting Daubert-progeny
criteria.6 Haack, in the Dalhousie Law Journal, contributes a
common-sense discussion clarifying many misunderstandings
about what is good scientific evidence and how that is deter-
mined. In a useful comment pointing out that scientific
inquiry is in fact continuous with everyday empirical inquiry,
she quotes Thomas Huxley as saying, “the man of science sim-
ply uses with scrupulous exactness the methods which we all
. . . use carelessly.”7
The Unsubstantiated Claims 
of Turkat’s Harmful Effects 
of Child-Custody Evaluations 
on Children
Jonathan W. Gould & Allan Posthuma
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Writing from both a legal and forensic-psychological per-
spective, psychologist Robert Kelly and attorney Sarah Ram-
sey have written about the importance in the age of Daubert
and its progeny of judges and attorneys developing a better
understanding of social-science research and the scientific
processes that comprise a well-done empirical study.8 They
argue that judges need to understand better the methodologi-
cal strengths and deficiencies of studies cited in an expert wit-
ness’ oral or written testimony. They proposed a set of guide-
lines for judges and attorneys to follow to determine the
forensic usefulness of a study drawn from behavioral-science
literature.9
Several mental-health professionals have provided direction
for forensic psychologists in ensuring the proffered evidence
needs to conform with various indicia of scientific validity to
satisfy the gatekeeping role performed by the judge.10 This
healthy cross-fertilization of legal and forensic-psychological
research has contributed to many jurisdictions in Canada and
the United States incorporating, in family-law legislation,
requirements not only for the need of expert evidence having
proof in scientific literature, but also for the examiner to
answer specific questions put forth, either by counsel or the
court, which must be addressed by the expert. In many cases,
this enables the expert to focus on specific issues before the
court, thus increasing the likelihood of being able to provide
strong scientific evidence. Forensic psychologists are thus
more likely to be able to find scientific support addressing spe-
cific issues than broad statements on best interests of children
in parenting plans or custody evaluations. 
MOST CUSTODY EVALUATIONS ARE USED TO SETTLE,
NOT LITIGATE
We believe child-custody evaluations should involve more
than providing the court with recommendations about resi-
dential placement (physical custody) and decision making
(legal custody). There are many useful ways in which a child-
custody evaluation may provide reliable information to courts
about a variety of issues.
Approximately 90% of child-custody evaluations are used as
settlement tools that lead to out-of-court resolution of custody
disputes. The use of a custody evaluation in this manner
results in families being spared the increased conflict and ten-
sions that are part of custody
litigation. We conclude, there-
fore, that an important role
played by a well-conducted
child-custody evaluation is to
reduce the likelihood that fam-
ilies will litigate and to increase
the likelihood that a negotiated
settlement would lead to rea-
sonable compromises.
Turkat fails to note this point
in condemning child-custody evaluations because of the finan-
cial burden they put on families. The fact that child-custody
evaluations are a financial burden reflects only one perspective,
but not the whole story. Certainly, a child-custody evaluation
that leads to litigation rather than settlement would become
another significant cost in the litigation process. However, as
described above, since most custody evaluations lead to settle-
ment, the evaluation-as-settlement tool avoids the cost of liti-
gation. It has been our experience that when custody evaluators
claim that they often testify in court about their evaluations, it
is very likely that their evaluations are either sub-par or viewed
as unfair and biased. Evaluation reports that lead to settlement
do not end up being the focus of litigation since the parties set-
tle out of court.
PROFESSIONAL CONSENSUS ABOUT PROCEDURES TO
BE UTILIZED IN A CHILD-CUSTODY EVALUATION
The methodological steps employed in a child-custody
evaluation have changed over the past 30 years. Today, there
is a general consensus in law and mental health that the
methodology of a custody evaluation includes multiple inter-
views of the parents, interviews with the children, direct
observation of parent-child interaction, interviews with third
parties who have directly observed parent-child interaction,
administration of psychological tests, and review of past and
current records.11 In an effort to make custody evaluations
more relevant to the unique issues presented by a particular
family, attorneys and judges have been advised to provide spe-
cific questions to evaluators that define the scope of their eval-
uations and guide their investigative work.12 The legal stan-
dard of what is in the best interests of the child is intention-
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ally undefined13 to allow
judges maximum flexibility in
determining which factors are
most relevant in a particular
family system. Although some
states have defined factors that
must be considered by the
court, these best-interest fac-
tors do not define the universe
of factors that may be impor-
tant for a court to consider in a
particular custody dispute. Yet
when courts or attorneys pro-
vide evaluators with specific questions to focus on, the result-
ing custody report is improved in two ways: by providing
information about issues deemed most relevant by the court
and/or attorneys and by introducing evidence-based research
to address the questions of concern.
Over the past 20 years, the movement toward brief, focused
custody evaluations has been another important change in the
custody field. Some jurisdictions have instituted evaluations
that target one or two questions. Professional practice guide-
lines have been promulgated to assist in the formulation and
performance of brief, focused evaluations.14
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS CAN PROVIDE MORE TO 
THE COURT THAN OPINIONS ABOUT CUSTODIAL
PLACEMENT 
A child-custody evaluation is not limited to providing the
court with expert opinions about custodial placement and
parental decision making. A well-conducted child-custody
evaluation may provide the court with information about fam-
ily functioning that would not otherwise be available to it. The
evaluator brings to the evaluation process an understanding of
how to employ the scientific method to achieve the most reli-
able set of data available. One means of obtaining reliable data
is through the use of forensic methods and procedures.15 That
is, information is gathered from multiple independent sources,
enabling the evaluator to analyze the degree to which each
independent data source converges on the same or similar
findings. The five independent data sources used in a child-
custody evaluation include multiple interviews with each par-
ent, multiple interviews and/or observations of each child,
direct observation of each parent with each child, psychologi-
cal testing when appropriate, collateral record review, and col-
lateral interviews of individuals who have direct observational
knowledge of parent-child interactions. The confidence with
which an evaluator is able to offer an expert opinion is directly
related to the number of independent data sources supporting
the opinion.
Turkat’s claim that there is no scientific evidence for custody
recommendations is not new. Feinberg has voiced a similar
concern, reflecting the often-heard criticism of child-custody
evaluations by attorneys.16 Tippins and Wittman argued that
there is scant empirical evidence upon which expert opinions
about custodial placement are based and urged evaluators to
stop short of making residential-placement recommenda-
tions.17
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS GUIDE RELEVANT INQUIRY
We argue, however, that the usefulness of a custody evalua-
tion is directly related to the nature and quality of the specific
questions that guide the investigation. For example, the court
may be concerned about whether a parent’s mental-health con-
dition adversely affects the children and, if so, whether it is
something that might respond to mental-health treatment or
medical/pharmacological intervention. The court may be con-
cerned about how children have developed a dysfunctional
relationship with one parent while aligning in an unhealthy
way with the other parent and seek recommendations about
how to help the children develop a more balanced, healthy
relationship with both parents.
INTEGRATING PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH ACROSS SOCIAL-SCIENCE DISCIPLINES
In the past, custody or parenting-plan evaluators often over-
looked the extensive and rich developmental research pub-
lished in highly regarded peer-reviewed journals, typically con-
fined to the academic world.18 However, in the last decade,
many of these research interests have expanded into the class-
room, parenting classes, and the courtroom. 
• One such area is research on executive function. Execu-
tive function refers to the development in the brain, as
well as in real life, of the ability to problem solve and, in
essence, meet the demands of life at school, at home,
and on the work site. One fascinating insight provided
by this research is that progress can be measured, not
only by psychological tests designed to measure the abil-
ity to problem solve, but also in neuroimaging scans of
the brain, and in particular the frontal areas of the brain.
From the forensic standpoint, another encouraging
development is the examination of educational and par-
enting strategies to improve executive function, not only
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in North America, but in many countries and cultures
across the world.19
• Executive-function research, in the real world of
the classroom and home, is sufficiently replicated
to enable forensic psychologists to answer specific
questions of interaction of each parent’s potential
ability to provide the coping mechanisms and
skills of their child, or children, in facing the
demands of the world they will encounter in the
future. 
• Research examining prediction of parental deci-
sion making demonstrates that pre-separation
communication between parents often predicted
post-divorce communication once litigation
ended.20 These research findings suggest that it
may be possible to predict which parents are more
likely to engage in cooperative communication
once the litigation is complete. The evaluator may
look at factors identified in the literature as asso-
ciated with a negative prediction of future cooper-
ative communication. Evaluators who gather
information about the parents’ past and present
decision making about the children may be able to
provide a prediction about which parents are more
likely to engage in cooperative communication. 
• Research now helps courts to understand better how
each family member in a divorced family system con-
tributes to one or more of the children’s attitudes and
behaviors regarding resisting visitation. The child-alien-
ation model described by Johnston and Kelly21 provides
a map of how to investigate the contribution of each
family member to children’s resistance to visit with a
parent.
• Empirical research and scholarship in child develop-
ment have provided a wealth of data that serves as the
basis for age-appropriate and developmentally appropri-
ate parenting-access-plan guidelines for the court to
consider when making parenting-plan decisions. For
example, there is ample research addressing the devel-
opmental limitations of children aged four and under.22
• Research from intact and divorcing families regarding
the psychological and social effects of relocation on chil-
dren’s adjustment has greatly evolved over the past 15
years. An assessment model
addressing empirically based
risk factors has been devel-
oped to predict the risk to a
child whose parent intended
to relocate to a geographically
distant location.23
Research has also addressed
the relationship between
parental gatekeeping and
parental access.24 Other useful
research provides more specific
examination of gatekeeping, parental access, and relocation.
FACTS ARE IMPORTANT, AND HYPERBOLE MISLEADS
We are most concerned, however, by the several claims
made by Dr. Turkat that are not supported by research and that
create a false impression about the utility of custodial evalua-
tions. There is no research to date that addresses the type of
custodial evaluations that are most often ordered by courts. In
fact, many jurisdictions around the country are limiting their
orders for custody evaluators to brief, focused evaluations.
Other jurisdictions direct evaluators not to address the ulti-
mate issues regarding expert opinions about custodial place-
ment.25 Some jurisdictions have begun to rely on reports from
guardians ad litem to investigate concerns in custody disputes,
choosing to bypass the use of child-custody evaluators (e.g.,
New Hampshire).
Turkat argues that there are several ways in which a custody
evaluation may be detrimental. On the other hand, since there
is no empirical examination of the short- and long-term effects
of expert opinions regarding custodial placement and decision
making on judicial determinations, it is just as easy to argue
that custody evaluations may be helpful. Neither argument has
been empirically examined. In fact, scholars have not yet been
able to develop a valid research study of these issues.
It is not uncommon in custody disputes for one parent to
argue emotional, mental, or behavioral superiority over the
other parent. When a parent in an unhealthy marriage seeks
counseling to learn how to cope with the stresses of the rela-
tionship, this is often presented by the other parent as a sign
of emotional weakness or parental incompetence. In rarer cir-
cumstances, a parent may have a history of admissions to
psychiatric hospitals for a variety of problems. Experienced
We are most 
concerned . . . 
Dr. Turkat . . .
create[s] a false
impression about
the utility 
of custodial 
evaluations.
Court Review - Volume 52 163
26. Stuart A. Greenberg & Daniel W. Shuman, Irreconcilable Conflict
Between Therapeutic and Forensic Roles, 28 PROF. PSYCH.: RES. &
PRAC. 50 (1997).
and qualified forensic psychol-
ogists typically have extensive
academic and clinical expertise
with such cases and know
when to consult with other
mental-health specialists to
determine the relevance of a
parent’s mental health to the
welfare of the children
involved. 
Turkat, however, makes no
reference at all to such important details, nor to the diverse
responses of courts. He does not draw a distinction between or
among the data obtained by the evaluator, the analysis of the
data by the evaluator, the discussion of the meaning of the
analysis of the data in light of the issues faced by the family,
and the expert opinions that are proffered to the court based
upon these data and analyses. We choose not to throw the baby
out with the bathwater. Courts may find useful the data in an
evaluation report but not the expert opinions. They may find
useful the data and analysis but not the expert opinions. They
may find useful the data, the analysis, and the application of
these data and analyses to the issues faced by the family but
not the expert opinions. Courts may find useful the data,
analysis, and application to the family and agree with some of
the expert opinions. Courts may find useful the data, analysis,
and application to the family and accept all of the expert opin-
ions. Courts may also modify expert opinions by incorporating
information from other parts of the case to which the evalua-
tor had no access.
FORENSIC EVALUATION IS NOT PSYCHOTHERAPY
Turkat argues that a significant number of psychotherapy
patients are harmed by psychotherapy. He then makes the
unsupportable argument that since mental-health profession-
als conduct forensic evaluations, it makes sense to consider
that mental-health experts will harm those who they forensi-
cally evaluate in a manner similar to the ways in which psy-
chotherapy has been shown to be harmful to some patients.
Whether in court or in journal articles, those who make asser-
tions such as that proffered by Turkat about forensic evalua-
tions causing harm have, in our view, a responsibility to cite
empirical research to support such a claim.
It is one thing to offer an opinion based upon clinical expe-
rience and observation rather than based upon empirical
research as long as the basis of the opinion is clearly stated.
Statements without attribution to experience or empirical data
may mislead the reader to an unsupported conclusion.
Further, there is little parallel between the activities of a
psychotherapist with a patient and the activities of a forensic
evaluator and a litigant. There is a robust literature addressing
differences between clinical assessment and forensic assess-
ment and between therapeutic and forensic roles.26 The pur-
pose of psychotherapy is to assist the client to change prob-
lematic aspects of her or his life. Therapists are intended to be
helpful to their clients. The purpose of forensic assessment is
to assist the court in understanding a particular psycho-legal
issue. In the case of a child-custody evaluation, the purpose is
to gather information about a family system with the goal of
assisting the court in its determinations about parental access
and parental decision making. Therapy is fundamentally dif-
ferent from forensic assessment.
DIAGNOSIS IS SELDOM USEFUL IN CHILD-CUSTODY
EVALUATIONS
Turkat spends time discussing the “substantial scientific
evidence that diagnostic errors in healthcare are common, cre-
ating serious negative consequences and costing billions of
dollars” (p. 153). The implication that Turkat appears to want
the reader to draw is that because diagnostic errors in the
healthcare industry cause “serious negative consequences and
cost[] billions of dollars,” it follows that diagnosis in child-
custody assessment creates serious negative consequences and
adds significantly to the cost of the evaluation. There is no evi-
dence to support this assertion.
Further, most custody texts addressing how to conduct
child-custody evaluations emphasize the lack of usefulness of
mental-health diagnoses. In the vast majority of child-custody
cases, a mental-health diagnosis does not provide information
to the court about parenting or parent-child interaction. A
mental-health diagnosis provides no information to the evalu-
ator or to the courts about the ways in which the behaviors
associated with a mental-health diagnosis are related to par-
enting behaviors. Without demonstrating a nexus between the
mental-health diagnosis and parenting behavior, the diagnostic
label provides only another term to be used as a weapon in the
parents’ custodial battle.
SCIENTIFIC PROCESS IS IMPORTANT EVEN WHEN 
WRITING FOR A NON-SCIENTIFIC AUDIENCE
It’s important to note that the research conducted by Dr.
Turkat, as described in his paper, would not be accepted by
most peer-reviewed journals. The primary reason is the lack of
a control group. While he could certainly claim that the
respondents to his survey were disenchanted, there is no way
he could determine whether the only individuals who
responded to the survey were those who were disenchanted.
For most regulatory psychological boards in Canada and the
United States, statistics have been interpreted to indicate that
the highest rate of complaints to regulatory organizations
come from parents who did not receive the custody or parent-
ing-plan arrangements they believed they deserved.
The psychological research, conducted by an agency or an
academic institution, typically must be approved by an ethics
committee. It is unlikely any ethics committee or, for that
matter, the judiciary, would randomly make custody arrange-
ments or parenting plans irrespective of the merits or short-
comings of the parenting plan. When forensic evaluators con-
[T]he research
conducted by 
Dr. Turkat . . .
would not be
accepted by most
peer-reviewed
journals.
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tact therapists, counselors, or teachers involved with either
the parents or the children, they must factor in these sources
of information. They probably receive only the viewpoint or
perspective of the parent or student and, thus, from a forensic
standpoint, have a biased view. Forensic evaluators must use
the information provided by the client—but only in the con-
text of various other sources of information, including other
collateral interviews, psychological testing, and observations
of various combinations of immediate and extended family
interactions.
VOICES OF CHILDREN ARE INCREASINGLY HEARD 
AND RESPECTED 
In the United States and Canada, an increasing number of
states and provinces have legislation providing for considera-
tion of the rights and views of the child in defining a parenting
plan or custody resolution. In British Columbia, where the sec-
ond author practices, the courts are increasingly likely to have
a Views of the Child report, instead of the more traditional
assessment of the complete family. The law in British Colum-
bia, similar to Article 123 of the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, requires the court and the examiner to
assess not only the child’s wishes, but whether the recommen-
dation is in the best interest of the child.  
Too often, when parents litigate custody, the voices of their
children are either ignored or are presented through each par-
ent’s perspective.27 A custody evaluation should provide infor-
mation to the court about the children’s perspective through
their eyes, not filtered through the eyes of their parents or their
parents’ attorneys. A custody evaluation will often include
information about the children’s experiences within the binu-
clear family and information about the children’s wishes. There
are emerging data about children’s desire to participate in deci-
sion making about their custodial placement.28 Some children
want nothing to do with decision making about their custodial
placement while other children are eager to share their ideas
and opinions. A custody evaluation will often include relevant
information about the children’s experiences with each family,
each extended family, and other child-related areas of exami-
nation.
Dr. Turkat raises a valid point about the need for the court
and forensic examiners to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of
children. In most situations, examiners and the court try to
minimize contributing to the distress of children. However, as
the court is aware, most situations in which a forensic exami-
nation is ordered typically follow the most protracted, vitriolic
disputes, in which the children may have already developed
emotional, behavioral, and academic problems. Legislatures,
courts, and forensic examiners are deeply aware of the destruc-
tive forces operating on children in these disputes and have
attempted various ways to minimize the damage done to chil-
dren, unfortunately often with less-than-satisfying results. 
NO EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
FOR HARMFUL EFFECTS ON
CHILDREN OF CHILD-
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 
The last criticism offered by
Turkat about the alleged harmful
effects of child-custody assess-
ment is focused on the intrusive-
ness of the evaluation process.
Turkat acknowledges that there
has been no empirical examina-
tion of the relationship between the alleged intrusiveness of a
child-custody assessment and the negative effects on the par-
ent-child relationship. Nonetheless, he opines that “it is rea-
sonable to expect potential detrimental effects” resulting from
the custody-evaluation process (p. 154). Turkat does not
explain why it is reasonable to expect potential detrimental
effects from a custody assessment. In fact, it is possible to
infer the opposite effect. In more than 90% of cases in which
a custody evaluation has been conducted, the evaluation
reports become tools for settlement. That is, a well-done eval-
uation will often keep the parties out of court. The findings
and recommendations often serve as a basis for out-of-court
settlement.
CHEAP SHOT AT A TERRIBLY UNFORTUNATE AND SAD
EXAMPLE OF UNPROFESSIONAL BEHAVIOR 
We believe, however, that it was a mistake of Dr. Turkat to
focus much of his concluding section on the highly publicized
emotional and professional problems of one practitioner, the
late Dr. Stuart Greenberg. This section owed more to sensa-
tionalism than scholarship; it contributed nothing of merit to
the other important points raised by Dr. Turkat elsewhere in
his paper. 
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS ARE OFTEN A NECESSARY
INTRUSION 
We agree that the custody-evaluation process is intrusive.
To be effective, it is, in our view, unavoidably so. We have
described how practitioners respectfully and thoroughly fol-
low best practices in conducting the process. Yet evaluators
must investigate many aspects of how the parents and children
function across a wide variety of activities and environments.
Evaluator interviews with collateral informants may be experi-
enced as intrusive by some parents while being welcomed by
other parents. However, we believe that the custody-evaluation
process is best regarded as an inoculation rather than a long-
term illness. Individuals who are given an inoculation may suf-
fer short-term discomfort from the needle piercing the skin
and penetrating into the blood, yet the long-term advantages
far outweigh the temporary discomfort. So, too, the custody-
evaluation process may cause short-term discomfort that
should nonetheless promote long-term advantages for the
overall health of the family.
A custody 
evaluation
should provide
information to
the court about
the children’s
perspective . . . .
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JUDGES AS GATEKEEPERS:
TIPS TO IDENTIFYING A 
COMPETENTLY CONDUCTED
CHILD-CUSTODY EVALUATION
There are several tips that can
guide judges in determining the
quality of a child-custody evalua-
tion. The first step is to examine
the evaluator’s training. Ask the
evaluator whether he or she has
obtained specialized training in
each of the procedures employed in a custody evaluation.
Judges are encouraged to carefully examine the expert’s con-
tinuing-education workshops and publication list (CV) to
ensure that the proposed expert has developed specialized
knowledge in child-custody assessment. The proposed expert
should have recently attended continuing education in child-
custody assessment as well as in the areas of concern specific
to the matter before the court, e.g., relocation, alienation,
domestic violence, LGBT parenting. The proposed expert
should be educated about the current professional and scien-
tific knowledge of the areas of concern before the court, and,
when possible, the expert may demonstrate evidence of
authoring or co-authoring peer-reviewed publications in those
areas specific to the matter before the court.
An important area for judges to examine is whether the
evaluator conducted a forensic rather than a clinical interview
of the parents and children. In a forensic interview, the evalu-
ator gathers information about particular areas of interest that
are identified in the specific questions that define the scope
and purpose of the evaluation. A custody-assessment interview
is not a clinical interview in the sense that the forensic inter-
viewer, not the party, is in charge of the direction of the inter-
view. In a clinical interview, the patient leads the therapist. In
a forensic interview, the interviewer is focused on obtaining
information about specific areas of concern identified by the
questions that guide the evaluation.
Judges need to examine the interview data to ensure that
each question posed at the beginning of the evaluation was sys-
tematically investigated by the interviewer. Similarly, the judge
needs to examine interview data from children and collateral
informants to ensure that the evaluator obtained information
that directly answered the questions that guided the evalua-
tion.
Judges should ask evaluators to explain their choice in psy-
chological tests. Evaluators need to explain to the court why a
particular set of tests was chosen. The evaluator needs to
explain how the selected tests are used to create information
from parent responses that can help answer the questions
posed at the beginning of the evaluation process.
Judges also need to inquire about the context of the parent-
child observation. Parent-child observations that take place in
the parent’s home are likely to produce information about par-
ent-child interactions that are more representative of their
daily behavior than information obtained during a parent-child
observation at the evaluator’s office.
Judges also need to know whether the evaluator partici-
pated in the parent-child observation or whether the evaluator
intentionally chose not to participate. Information from par-
ent-child observations are best when the evaluator simply
watches and does not interact with the parent or the child. The
more the evaluator becomes engaged in the parent-child obser-
vation, the more likely the observational information is
changed from a parent-child observation to a parent-child-
evaluator observation.
Judges need to scrutinize the quality of information
obtained from collateral informants. Too often, evaluators pro-
vide collateral interview data that is ripe with opinions and
vacant of behavioral observations. We learn little from a col-
lateral statement that the parent is loving and kind. We learn
more when the collateral statement describes how the parent
and child interacted. For example, a collateral informant
recently reported that she observed the child run up to her par-
ent, jump into her father’s arms, kiss him on the cheek, and say,
“I missed you today!” The father responded by smiling at his
daughter, getting down on one knee, and giving her a big hug.
They laughed and spontaneously began to sing a song. Behav-
ioral detail from a collateral informant—a fact witness—is far
superior to an opinion (that a parent is loving) from one who
should be a fact witness.
Another increasingly common aspect of quality reports is
for the evaluator to tie his or her expert opinions to the pro-
fessional and scientific literature. For example, when opining
on a parenting-access plan for a two-year-old, it is often help-
ful for the evaluator to cite to the relevant research articles that
support the expert opinion.
A CALL FOR INTERDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCES AND
TRAINING
We are also encouraged by the high-quality workshops
offered by state and national mental-health associations,
including those offered at the state and regional level by The
Association of Family & Conciliation Courts (AFCC), the
American Psychological Association (APA), and the American
Academy of Forensic Psychology (AAFP). Legal associations,
including the American Bar Association (ABA), the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), and state bar asso-
ciations around the country, are also providing high-quality
workshops. We find great value in interdisciplinary confer-
ences that focus on family law and related mental-health issues
such as the recent conferences co-presented by AFCC and
AAML. We view these workshops and conferences as examples
of healthy developments in psychology and the law. 
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS PROVIDE USEFUL 
INFORMATION TO THE COURTS AND, MORE OFTEN
THAN NOT, LEAD TO SETTLEMENT
We come to a very different conclusion than Dr. Turkat
about the usefulness of child-custody evaluations. We support
their use in cases in which expert mental-health professionals
can offer specialized knowledge to the court. We also believe
that evaluators need to do better. There are wide variations in
the quality of child-custody evaluations, and there are wide
variations in the abilities of attorneys and judges to identify a
competently conducted custody evaluation from a poorly con-
ducted custody evaluation.
Judges need to
scrutinize the
quality of 
information
obtained from
collateral 
informants.
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We believe that an important solution is for attorneys and
judges to become more familiar with what constitutes a com-
petently conducted custody evaluation. Once the bench and
the bar become more familiar with knowing how to identify a
competently conducted evaluation and then communicating
expectations to forensic practitioners that inferior reports will
no longer be accepted, the quality of evaluator reports will rise
to meet the expectations of the legal system. 
Science can advance only when there is vigorous examina-
tion and debate about issues of importance in the field. Scien-
tific inquiry and scientific debate are prescriptions for humil-
ity. They are our profession’s inherent forms of arrogance con-
trol. B.F. Skinner concluded that science requires a “willing-
ness to accept facts even when they are opposed to wishes.”29
We are, therefore, encouraged by the editors of this journal
requesting a second opinion on Dr. Turkat’s article. Dr. Turkat
has raised many important issues worthy of debate, and we are
honored to have been given the opportunity to participate in
this debate.
Jonathan Gould is a board-certified forensic
psychologist who specializes in psychological
concerns associated with family-law matters.
He has authored or co-authored five books,
including Conducting Scientifically Crafted
Child Custody Evaluations (2nd edition), The
Art and Science of Child Custody Evalua-
tions, and Psychological Experts in Divorce
Actions (6th edition). He has authored or co-authored more than
100 peer-reviewed articles about child-custody assessment, appli-
cation of psychological ethics to child-custody assessment, foren-
sic assessment of alienation dynamics, domestic violence, and
child sexual abuse. Dr. Gould has conducted more than 300 court-
appointed child-custody evaluations, consulted on more than
2,500 family-law-related matters. He has lectured widely on top-
ics about applying forensic methods and procedures to child-cus-
tody assessment, the application of Daubert principles to forensic
psychological assessment, application of child-development
research to crafting age-appropriate parenting plans, among other
areas of importance to family-law attorneys and courts. He may
be reached at jwgould53@gmail.com.
Dr. Posthuma holds diplomate status in forensic
and clinical psychology from the American
Board of Professional Psychology (ABPP). He
has provided evidence in personal-injury, crim-
inal, and family courts at the Supreme and
Provincial Court levels in Canada over the last
40 years. He has published and presented foren-
sic psychology research at national and interna-
tional conferences.  
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Consider a recent custody dispute presided over by JudgeMichael Algeo in Montgomery County, Virginia.1 Here, afather Judge Algeo ordered previously into supervised
visitation was asking the court to remove it. In weighing the
request, Judge Algeo ordered the father to have a psychologi-
cal evaluation. The psychologist who performed the evaluation
advised the court it was safe for the child to have unsupervised
visits with the father. Judge Algeo endorsed the psychologist’s
recommendation. The fourth unsupervised visit resulted in the
death of the child and the father charged with murder.2
In this tragic example, the court had significant concern
that led it to originally order supervised visitation, but it then
chose to listen to the advice of a psychologist instead of stick-
ing with its own initial judgment. If the court had not followed
the psychologist’s recommendation, that child might still be alive
today. The same could be said if the court had not ordered a
psychological evaluation in the first place. Can there be any
doubt that a psychological evaluation in a custody matter can
have harmful effects? As evidenced in Virginia, endorsing a
psychologist’s recommendation ended in a child’s wrongful
death.
As I set out to read Drs. Gould and Posthuma’s counter-
point, I was hopeful they would present scientific evidence I
was unaware of proving that child-custody evaluations benefit
children. Unfortunately, they did not present even one scien-
tific study showing that custody evaluations improve children’s
lives or don’t cause harm. Thus, their entire counterpoint is
one of opinion and speculation and therefore can easily be dis-
missed because we are way beyond needing more conjecture
about child-custody evaluations; what we need is scientific
data directly on point about the effects of these evaluations.
While Gould and Posthuma acknowledge that there is no sci-
entific evidence that custody evaluations benefit children, they
will keep doing them anyway. Thus, direct, on-point scientific
evidence of effectiveness doesn’t truly matter to Gould and
Posthuma when it comes to custody evaluations.
So what are children getting from a custody evaluation?
Gould admits that child-custody recommendations provided
to the court are merely guesses.3 Some custody-evaluator
guesses have cost as much as $57,0004 to over $300,000.5 Is it
right to force children to endure economic injury to their
future for such a guess? Higginbotham6 said “no,” and 65% of
parents in the harmful-effects study said “no.” On top of this,
Gould revealed that “we often provide testimony to the court
about custodial arrangements with the arrogance of ‘true’ sci-
ence implied.”7 So not only is the bench getting a guess not
based on scientific evidence of efficacy, it is presented with the
false implication that there is “true science” behind it. Such tes-
timony is the opposite of the scientific evidence. Thus, the judi-
ciary must contend often with twisted custody-evaluator testi-
mony it can’t easily unravel, complicated further when
wrapped in psychological jargon, while trying to avoid endors-
ing a custody recommendation that might prove detrimental.
CUSTODY-EVALUATION JARGON AND POTENTIAL
HARM
Gould and Posthuma reference the term “scientifically
crafted child custody evaluations,” which Dr. Gould created,8 I
am sure, with the best of intentions. The judiciary should be
wary of this jargon because there is no research in the scientific
literature that has crafted a child-custody-evaluation method
proven to produce fine rates of beneficial custodial placement
without harm. To produce such an effective custody-evalua-
tion protocol would require sophisticated large-scale scientific
investigations and take many years to develop. 
So what scientific evidence is Dr. Gould referring to in regard
170 Court Review - Volume 52 
Child Dead and Parent 
Charged with Murder After
Psychologist Recommends 
Said Parent to Court: 
Turkat Responds to Gould and Posthuma’s 
Custody-Evaluation Fallacies
Ira Daniel Turkat
Footnotes
1. Tom Jackman, Psychologist in Prince Rams Custody Case Paying
Mother $550,000 Legal Settlement, WASHINGTON POST, November 8,
2014.
2. Luke Mullins, The Wrong One, WASHINGTONIAN, December 13,
2013. 
3. JONATHAN W. GOULD, CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS (1998). 
9. Id. at 238.
10. Over 20 examples of mental-health professionals subjected to
disciplinary actions such as forced surrender of license, monetary
penalties, and probation for violating state licensing laws related
to custody-evaluation activities can be found on the webpage of
the Citizens Commission on Human Rights (co-founded by the
late prominent psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, Professor of Psychia-
try Emeritus at SUNY Upstate Medical University):
http://www.psychcrime.org/articles/index.php?vd=18.
11. See BRYAN STRONG, CHRISTINE DEVAULT & THEODORE F. COHEN, THE
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY EXPERIENCE: INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS IN A
CHANGING SOCIETY 466 (2010).
12. M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE
UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPRO-
MISE THEIR PROMISE TO HEAL (2011).
13. Id.
to “scientifically crafted child custody evaluations”? It can only
be on topics other than custodial arrangement, since there is no
scientific proof of benefit for any custody evaluation or plan.
Further, Gould has advised custody evaluators that one may
“cautiously” provide the court with “opinions that have no
basis in behavioral science literature” and does so in his book
Conducting Scientifically Crafted Child Custody Evaluations.9
With the oxymoronic quality of this jargon and Gould’s admis-
sion of the frequent twisted testimony of “true science falsely
implied,” the court could potentially be misled inadvertently to
believe that a particular custody guess has been scientifically
validated when, in fact, that guess may be harmful. 
To be clear, if we use the most appropriate criterion—a body
of direct scientific proof that custody evaluations improve chil-
dren’s lives—there is no such thing as a scientifically crafted
child-custody evaluation.
CUSTODY-EVALUATION HARM AND CUSTODY-
EVALUATOR GREENBERG
I profoundly disagree with Gould and Posthuma about how
we need to respond to the disasters that arise from harmful
custody evaluators like Stuart Greenberg. In essence, Gould
and Posthuma prefer to sweep under the rug the very vulnera-
bilities Greenberg revealed in what the judiciary faces when
dealing with any custody evaluator, especially prominent ones.
I argue that to do so is a disservice to the field, the judiciary,
and the children of custody litigation. 
When psychologists make mistakes, especially highly egre-
gious ones, it is our duty to learn from them to prevent such
mistakes from occurring again. Ultimately, if these mistakes so
illustrated by Greenberg are not properly addressed and cor-
rected, children of custody litigants remain no more protected
from harm today. Gould and Posthuma unwittingly prove my
point. While fully aware of Greenberg’s unethical manipula-
tions but choosing to sweep them under the rug, they pro-
posed tips for judges to evaluate a “competent” custody evalu-
ation, including ideas about how to evaluate a custody evalua-
tor. If one were to use Gould and Posthuma’s recommenda-
tions for identifying a “competent” custody evaluator, Green-
berg would have passed their test with flying colors. Conse-
quently, by following their advice, the bench would be in the
same position it was in before Dr. Greenberg was caught. 
It is important to know that Greenberg has not been the
only custody evaluator who seriously violated professional
rules, manipulated custody-evaluation data, or hurt families;
too many custody evaluators have been found guilty of violat-
ing ethical codes and/or state licensing law when conducting
child-custody evaluations.10 Permitting a scientifically
unproven child-custody evaluation today may come with a
degree of risk for exploitation as
well.
POTENTIAL HARM OF 
CONSTRUING CHILD-
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 
AS A SETTLEMENT TOOL
Gould and Posthuma justify
performing a child-custody eval-
uation by claiming it serves as a
settlement tool. It was disappointing to read their post hoc jus-
tification for many reasons.
No proof for claim. They provide no citation of any kind
and no scientific data at all for their claim that approximately
90% of custody evaluations result in a settlement. While Gould
and Posthuma demand substantiation from others, they don’t
demand it of themselves.
Misleading statistic. Gould and Posthuma fail to take into
account the American Bar Association’s statistic that 95% of all
divorces settle, which includes contested custody cases.11 Thus,
contrary to Gould and Posthuma’s presentation, there is no
apparent better settlement rate for having a custody evaluation
done. 
Failure to filter key factors. Since 95% of all divorces set-
tle, scientifically Gould and Posthuma would have to present
some sophisticated research proving that a custody evaluation
by itself and independent of other factors results in a superior law-
suit-settlement percentage for their claim to be accurate. No
such evidence exists. When a custody evaluation is followed by
new negotiations, mediation, and/or litigation and then a set-
tlement, it would be incorrect scientifically to claim the custody
evaluation caused that agreement, as the other factors may have
been responsible. Further, Georgetown University Professor of
Law M. Gregg Bloche has stated that courts have typically rub-
ber-stamped custody-evaluation recommendations;12 if true,
then a settlement would be primarily due to the rubber-stamping
effect and not any value of the custody recommendation. Clearly, if
courts consistently endorsed custody recommendations, it
wouldn’t matter scientifically whether the recommendations
were correct. And, of course, attorneys aware of a court’s rub-
ber-stamping history would advise their clients to make deci-
sions accordingly.13 If broadscale rubber-stamping is in fact
true, it would mean, unfortunately, that the courts are likely
rubber-stamping a worrisome number of harmful custody rec-
ommendations. Without filtering cases by these kinds of factors
in relation to the timing and terms of a settlement, scientifically
one can easily get an incorrect picture of what truly causes a set-
tlement and inflated claims thereof. Gould and Posthuma pro-
vided no such filtering for their claim.
When 
psychologists
make mistakes 
. . . it is our duty
to learn from
them . . . .
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Not in APA Guidelines.
Nowhere in the APA Guidelines
on child-custody evaluations
does the term “settlement tool”
or even the word “settlement”
appear.14 The purpose of a cus-
tody evaluation has never been
to serve as a settlement tool but rather, as stated in the APA
Guidelines, to “assist in determining the psychological best
interests of the child” because “the child’s welfare is para-
mount.”15
Guesses risk harm. Gould and Posthuma’s pivot to reframe
child-custody evaluations as “settlement tools” risks psycholo-
gists contributing to outcomes that are incompatible with APA
Guidelines that “the child’s welfare is paramount.” A psychol-
ogist’s incorrect guess may influence settlement negotiations to
produce an agreement that may be to a child’s detriment.
No scientific proof of any benefit. Even if used as a settle-
ment tool and even if 90% of cases settle following a custody
evaluation, there is no scientific evidence that this results in
beneficial outcomes for children and prevention of harm. 
Higher relitigation rates. Research studies show that fam-
ilies participating in child-custody evaluations have a higher
relitigation rate compared to those not participating in child-
custody evaluations.16 A good “settlement tool” should not
lead to higher rates of relitigation.  
Confusion about settlement tools. The APA Guidelines on
custody evaluations aspire to promote the best interest of chil-
dren, not settlement rate. Gould and Posthuma seem confused.
Settlement tools are not inherently good. For example, aggres-
sive litigation when it is unnecessary is sometimes used as a
settlement tool. Likewise, settlements are not inherently good;
parents may settle on terms not truly in a child’s best interest.
A settlement tool that contributes to a worse future for chil-
dren is not acceptable. 
Pressuring families financially. By the time a custody eval-
uation is completed, it is often late in the litigation sequence of
that lawsuit when money is tighter. Litigants have typically
spent considerable funds on legal expenses before a child-cus-
tody evaluation takes place. And if one party wishes to contest
an evaluator’s recommendation, both parties are hit economi-
cally with a double whammy: they must pay for the expensive
evaluation and a whole new leg of litigation expenses created
specific to the custody evaluation itself in terms of case prepara-
tion, depositions, experts, hearings, and so forth, that would
not have occurred otherwise. Thus, contesting a custody rec-
ommendation may be financially unwise for many and may
thereby render a litigant more likely to fold, even if the evalu-
ator’s guess about custody is wrong. The primary “tool” bring-
ing the parties to settle at that point is depletion of funds, not
any “cost-saving value” provided by the custody evaluation. 
Underestimated expense inflation. Gould and Posthuma
fail to specify how their “settlement tool” can inflate the par-
ties’ expenses not just after the evaluation but before it as well.
The New York case of E.V. v. R.V.17 demonstrated such expense
inflation before a scheduled child-custody evaluation began.
Here, the court-appointed custody evaluator, a psychiatrist,
completed his evaluation and provided recommendations to
the court without being informed that privately, a psychologist
had extensively coached the plaintiff with over 50 hours of
client preparation for the psychiatrist’s custody evaluation.18
While the psychologist’s highly prepped client lost that cus-
tody battle and thus would face even more hefty expenditures
if an effort to reverse that decision19 is made, it is clear that the
cost of over 50 hours of preparation by the psychologist and
any associated legal expenses would never have occurred if a
custody evaluation had not been performed. 
Better options elsewhere. There are other less expensive
tools that are designed specifically to facilitate settlement—
unlike custody evaluations, which are not designed to settle
cases. Examples include attorney negotiations, judicial prod-
ding, and mediation. Each of these can be “stepped up” and
still be less expensive and less intrusive than custody evalua-
tions.
FALSE, MISGUIDED, AND UNSUBSTANTIATED CLAIMS
MADE BY GOULD AND POSTHUMA
Dr. Gould and Dr. Posthuma made so many false, mis-
guided, and unsubstantiated claims in their counterpoint, I
cannot properly address them all here given restrictions on
journal space. Below are 10 of them, briefly corrected:
CUSTODY-EVALUATION COMPETENCY 
Gould and Posthuma: “We believe that an important solu-
tion is for attorneys and judges to become more familiar with what
constitutes a competently conducted custody evaluation. Once the
bench and the bar become more familiar with knowing how to
identify a competently conducted evaluation and then communi-
cating expectations to forensic practitioners that inferior reports
will no longer be accepted, then the quality of evaluator reports
will rise to meet the expectations of the legal system.”
Turkat: Gould and Posthuma propose turning the judiciary
into the custody-evaluator police. This proposal in and of itself
should greatly alarm you about the second-rate nature of
today’s custody evaluations. More critically, however, there is
no scientific evidence whatsoever to define a “competent”
child-custody evaluation. A far better solution than what
Gould and Posthuma proposed is for psychologists to develop
clear-cut scientific evidence directly proving that child-custody
evaluations benefit children without doing harm. Psychologists
are the ones who need to step up, not the judiciary. Further, by
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proposing that you police custody evaluators to identify
incompetent ones, Gould and Posthuma unwittingly admit
child-custody evaluations can cause harm; otherwise, why
would you need a “competent” evaluator? Finally, it would
seem that the proper definition to aspire to for a “competent”
custody evaluation might be: a correctly utilized child-custody-
evaluation protocol proven directly by a body of scientific research
to benefit children and not harm them. That is what families bat-
tling over custody need from custody evaluators, what the
judiciary wants from custody evaluators, and what psychology
should provide. Of course, if we use that definition, then every
custody evaluation performed today would be considered
incompetent.
DETRIMENTAL-EFFECTS RATIONALE
Gould and Posthuma: “Turkat does not explain why it is rea-
sonable to expect potential detrimental effects from a custody
assessment.”
Turkat: False. I provided six specific reasons in the intro-
duction to the harmful-effects study in the section labeled
“Why Child-Custody Evaluations May Be Detrimental.” 
EXPERTISE AND JUDGMENT IN CUSTODY CASES
Gould and Posthuma: “Experienced and qualified forensic
psychologists typically have extensive academic and clinical
expertise with such cases and know when to consult with other
mental-health specialists to determine the relevance of a parent’s
mental health to the welfare of the children involved.”
Turkat: Experience is not the same as a body of scientific
facts, nor is it a suitable substitute. Gould and Posthuma tout
the “clinical expertise” of forensic psychologists to make
determinations about the welfare of children in custody eval-
uations. In their example, such expertise includes making
clinical judgments that involve “knowing when” and “deter-
mining relevance” of “mental health” and the “welfare of chil-
dren.” All four of these terms require making clinical judg-
ments that easily give rise to different interpretations by dif-
ferent psychologists on the same set of case information. Even
on a term as common as “mental health,” scientists don’t agree
on how to define it or measure it.20 Nonetheless, Gould and
Posthuma want to reassure you about the clinical judgments
made by experienced custody evaluators like themselves. But
when discussing elsewhere how custody evaluators depend
greatly on clinical judgment in conducting interviews and
making observations, Dr. Posthuma stated that “clinical judg-
ment is notoriously unreliable.”21 I
agree; the scientific literature
shows generally that clinical
judgment is unreliable.22 Yet,
when promoting custody evalua-
tions in their counterpoint,
Gould and Posthuma encourage
you to rely on custody evaluators’ notoriously unreliable clinical
judgment without telling you how unreliable such clinical judg-
ment is. It exemplifies why you should be skeptical of what
custody evaluators tell you. What do scientists (not profes-
sional custody evaluators) say about such expertise? Promi-
nent scientist Emory University Professor Scott Lilienfeld tells
us that “[e]xpertise does not arise solely from experience
because there is no guarantee that we are not doing the wrong
thing over and over again.”23 Greenberg is an example.
Finally, experience is the primary basis underlying custody-
evaluator guesses, but a review of scientific evidence by Pro-
fessors Krauss and Sales reveals the risk for the judiciary to
endorse custody-evaluator recommendations for the future of
children: “It is well noted that psychologists as a group are
particularly inaccurate in making future behavioral predic-
tions and may even be more inaccurate than lay persons
are.”24 
ETHICS AND RANDOMIZATION IN RESEARCH ON 
PARENTING PLANS 
Gould and Posthuma: “The psychological research, con-
ducted by an agency or an academic institution, typically must be
approved by an ethics committee. It is unlikely any ethics com-
mittee or, for that matter, the judiciary, would randomly make cus-
tody arrangements or parenting plans irrespective of the merits or
shortcomings of the parenting plan.”
Turkat: False. Having served as a professor on university
ethics committees for scientific research, as well as having par-
ticipated as a co-investigator in a nationwide, multi-center
interdisciplinary clinical research trial funded by the National
Institute of Health (NIH), I advise the reader that Gould and
Posthuma’s speculation here is wrong. There is a substantial
scientific literature spanning decades of research designed to
evaluate a particular assessment procedure or intervention
with vulnerable populations that utilized randomization,25
including use of well-developed NIH-required Data and Safety
Monitoring Boards for clinical trials that provide oversight
while the study is ongoing for issues such as patient risks,
safety, and differential results emerging across research
Court Review - Volume 52 173
Experience is not
the same as a
body of scientific
facts . . . .
26. See https://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/studies/clinicaltrials/protect.
27. See FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 25.
28. Robert E. Emery, Lisa Laumann-Billings, Mary C. Waldron, David
A. Sbarra & Peter Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation:
Custody, Contact, and Co-Parenting 12 Years After Initial Dispute
Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (2001).
29. See Seymour L. Halleck, The Ethical Dilemmas of Forensic Psychia-
try: A Utilitarian Approach, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &  L.
279 (1984); ETHICAL ISSUES IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: MINIMIZING
HARM (Robert L. Sadoff ed., 2011).
30. An APA PsycINFO database search reveals over 8,000 entries for
“exploratory study” in peer-reviewed journals in the psychological
literature, which includes exploratory studies with and without
control groups. See also ROBERT A. STEBBINS, EXPLORATORY RESEARCH
IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2001).
groups.26 Since there is no scien-
tific data proving the benefits or
detriments of any parenting plan,
research that randomly assigns
subjects to different commonly
used parenting plans can indeed
be implemented in line with the
well-established research proto-
cols and ethical protections
already existing in the scientific literature.27 While Gould and
Posthuma doubt the judiciary would randomly assign custody-
litigation families to different research groups that might gener-
ate different outcomes for children, court participation in ran-
domly assigning contested-custody cases in related psychologi-
cal research has already been done successfully.28
HARM BY FORENSIC EVALUATORS 
Gould and Posthuma: “Whether in court or in journal arti-
cles, those who make assertions such as that proffered by Turkat
about forensic evaluations causing harm have, in our view, a
responsibility to cite empirical research to support such a claim.”
Turkat: I did precisely that. I reported research data from
the harmful-effects study. At no point, however, did Drs. Gould
and Posthuma meet the exact same standard they insisted I
meet—“a responsibility to cite empirical research” to prove
that custody evaluations improve children’s lives. Further,
Gould and Posthuma do not seem all that concerned that cus-
tody evaluations may harm children, but other forensic evalu-
ators have raised alarm for decades that forensic evaluations
can cause harm.29
DISENCHANTMENT OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS TOWARD
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS
Gould and Posthuma: “[H]e could certainly claim that the
respondents to his survey were disenchanted.”
Turkat: False. There was no study of “disenchantment” and
no specific measurement of it; Gould and Posthuma misinter-
pret the research methodology and data. When parents report
that money spent on a child-custody evaluation was not in
their children’s best interest or that the custody evaluation
made their children worse, I very much doubt that “disen-
chantment” properly characterizes the reaction of these par-
ents. Like many exploratory studies, a control group was not
necessary30 for the harmful-effects study and certainly not one
based on a speculation like “disenchantment.”
[O]ther forensic
evaluators have
raised . . . 
that forensic
evaluations can
cause harm.
HARMFUL EFFECTS “BY DEFINITION” 
Gould and Posthuma: “[W]e challenge his primary thesis
that child-custody evaluations are, by definition, harmful.”
Turkat: False. I did not say that “by definition” child-cus-
tody evaluations are harmful. What I did assert was that, just
as psychotherapy and diagnostic errors have been shown sci-
entifically to produce harmful effects in a certain percentage of
patients, it is reasonable to predict that similar tasks performed
by psychologists that involve making important appraisals of
individuals presenting scientifically unclear phenomena such as
in child-custody evaluations, may produce harmful effects as
well. And then I provided quantitative evidence of potential
harm. What scientific evidence did Drs. Gould and Posthuma
present to “challenge” the harmful effects of custody evalua-
tions? None.
BRIEF CUSTODY EVALUATIONS
Gould and Posthuma: “[T]he movement toward brief,
focused custody evaluations has been another important change in
the custody field. . . . Professional practice guidelines have been
promulgated to assist in the formulation and performance of brief,
focused evaluations.”
Turkat: There is no scientific evidence that a brief child-
custody evaluation benefits children and does not harm them.
The same is true of practice guidelines for child-custody eval-
uations. Even if a brief custody evaluation costs only a nickel,
without scientific proof of benefit and absence of harm, a brief
evaluation still results in an evaluator’s guess that may prove
detrimental to children. I suggest keeping this fact in mind:
when you shop for a car and buy a lemon, saving a few dol-
lars on the purchase doesn’t change the fact that the car is a
lemon.
POST HOC JUSTIFICATION OF A CHILD-CUSTODY 
EVALUATION 
Gould and Posthuma: “A child-custody evaluation is not
limited to providing the court with expert opinions about custodial
placement and parental decision making. A well-conducted child-
custody evaluation may provide the court with information about
family functioning that would not otherwise be available to it.”
Turkat: The same post hoc justification can be applied to
the content of almost any investigation of a family, whether it
be by a guardian ad litem, school counselor, or otherwise.
Critically, however, one must consider a family’s financial
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When the judiciary demands psychologists to provide
direct, on-point scientific proof that child-custody evaluations
benefit children and do not harm them before permitting a cus-
tody evaluation, then judges will be providing children of
future custody litigation a better opportunity for improved
lives and protection from harm that does not exist today. The
answer lies in sophisticated, direct, on-point future scientific
research on the beneficial and detrimental effects of child-cus-
tody evaluations. Demand it of psychologists, and help them
identify ways to fund the necessary research; listen to the scien-
tists over the professional custody evaluators. If you do so, I am
confident that psychologists will rise to the challenge. To date,
psychologists have failed you and the children of custody liti-
gation that require your rulings. 
It is high time for the science of psychology to deliver its
great potential for assisting the children caught in the middle
of custody battles. Ironically, in order to help lift child-custody
evaluations out of a fantasy of scientific respectability into a
better future for the children of custody litigation, your lead in
this effort is truly essential. Without it, these children remain
on course for a future affected by scientifically unsupported
and potentially harmful guesses.
Dr. Turkat advises family-law attorneys on
child-custody disputes. A licensed psychologist,
he has served on the faculty at Vanderbilt Uni-
versity School of Medicine and University of
Florida College of Medicine. In 2011, the
50,000-member British Psychological Society
named him alongside three of the world’s most
outstanding clinical psychologists in history for
their influential work on case formulation; Dr. Turkat is the only
American named among the four. Address all correspondence to:
Ira Daniel Turkat, Ph.D., 2015 South Tuttle Avenue, Sarasota,
Florida 34239; Telephone (941) 488-8093.
31. See http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/
vac-gen/side-effects.htm#hepa.
situation before subjecting it to expensive investigations, and,
in the case of psychologists, one must also consider scientific
evidence about effectiveness and harm. There is no scientific
evidence that a court learning some new information about
family functioning from a custody evaluation benefits children.  
HYPOTHESIZED CUSTODY-EVALUATION BENEFITS 
Gould and Posthuma: “[T]he custody-evaluation process is
best regarded as an inoculation rather than a long-term illness.
Individuals who are given an inoculation may suffer short-term
discomfort from the needle piercing the skin and penetrating into
the blood, yet the long-term advantages far outweigh the tempo-
rary discomfort.”
Turkat: False. There is no scientific evidence in the litera-
ture supporting this speculation by Gould and Posthuma about
alleged benefits of custody evaluations. Further, their “inocu-
lation” analogy proves my point: the Centers for Disease Con-
trol reports that any vaccine can cause problems, and some
may cause serious injury or death.31 As such, it is reasonable to
expect that custody evaluations can produce harmful effects,
including serious ones.
WHAT SHOULD THE JUDICIARY DO ABOUT CHILD-
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS?
Is there really any advantage for children to be subjected to
a child-custody evaluation? The evidence to date reveals none.
It is time to override any existing belief you may have that a
custody evaluator’s guess about a child’s future is going to be
better than yours. Custody evaluators’ educated guesses are sci-
entifically no more valid than your own educated guesses about
custodial placement, despite psychologists having had decades
to prove otherwise. 
Moreover, when you allow a custody evaluation to proceed,
you are placing a child at risk for potential harm. Only by par-
ticipating in a custody evaluation can a child be potentially
harmed by that evaluation. By preventing a child-custody evalu-
ation, you are guaranteeing that child will not be exposed to
potential harm from a custody evaluation.
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Across
1 Not fast
5 Butterflies’ kin
10 Gem that may be carved
14 Prefix with byte
15 End in ___
16 Tabloid sightings, briefly
17 Short flight info?
18 Cherish
19 Let go of
20 Convent figure
23 Olden daggers
24 Oily bunch?
25 Small firecracker
29 Philatelist’s collection
33 Homophone of 1-Across
36 Hurdle for a jr.
38 South Pacific spot
39 Longtime role for the late Bob 
Keeshan
43 Declares
44 Stew veggie
45 Sightseer?
46 Constructed from
48 Allen or Coen
51 Surrounding glow
53 Gently gallops
57 Oldsmobile model rolled out 
in 1966
62 Half a Hawaiian fish?
63 Standish of Plymouth Colony
64 Make haunted house noises
65 Some sibs
66 Delight
GONE A-COURTIN’ by Judge Victor Fleming
58 “Oy!”
59 Sign of freshness?
60 Org. looking for signs of aliens
61 Not new
62 JD-___ (joint degree letters)
67 Licorice-flavored liqueur
68 Big Apple tennis stadium name
69 Savory
70 Ex-Yankee Sparky
Down
1 Goblets’ features
2 Allow to board
3 Give a valedictory, say
4 Hoses down
5 Dora ___ (Picasso’s muse)
6 “What are the ___?”
7 Drop ___
8 Nonspeaking Marx
9 Key ratings period
10 Res ___ (lawsuit defense)
11 Woodstock hairdo
12 It helps you get in
13 Seer’s claim
21 Lawyer letters?
22 Mark up or down, say
26 Grp. that’ll send you a release
27 “Money ___ object”
28 1978 precedent-winning 
litigant
30 Greater quantity
31 Pretext
32 Homophone of 1-Across
33 Three-card monte, notably
34 Type of lamp
35 Newspaper’s ___ page
37 Dainty dessert
40 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
for one
41 Not ___ (no one)
42 “Fuhgeddaboutit ...”
47 Portrait holders
49 Continental peak
50 Not irregular
52 Sanctuaries
54 Part of a bouquet
55 Modern missive
56 Perceive
57 Garage occupants
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 175.
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Procedural-Fairness Interviews
Proceduralfairnessguide.org/interviews 
The American Judges Association
(AJA) conducted interviews about proce-
dural fairness with nine national leaders
on issues involving judges and the courts.
The interviews, done by Kansas Court of
Appeals Judge and past AJA president
Steve Leben, cover the elements of proce-
dural fairness for courts and judges, how
judges can improve fairness skills, and
how the public reacts to courts and judges. 
In addition to the video interviews, in
which you’d watch separate interviews
with each of the nine leaders we talked
to, there are a series of podcasts that take
clips from the other interviews and com-
bine them into audio podcasts on three
topics: (1) Improving Judicial Behavior,
(2) Procedural Fairness in Judicial Train-
ing and Evaluation, and (3) Procedural
Fairness as a Model for Modern Author-
ity. These audio podcasts were put
together by Justine Greve, a staff member
with the Kansas Court of Appeals. They
run eight to ten minutes apiece. Just click
on the “Podcasts” tab to find them.
The interviews that are available are:
Professor Tom Tyler (15:48): Yale
Law School Professor Tom Tyler is the
leading scholar in the United States on
procedural justice in both law-enforce-
ment and court contexts. He provides an
overview of all the basic concepts, along
with practical advice for judges to use in
the courtroom. 
Emily Gold LaGratta (12:14): Emily
Gold LaGratta, the Deputy Director of
Training and Technical Assistance at the
Center for Court Innovation (CCI), dis-
cusses CCI projects designed to help
implement these principles in specific
courts, as well as specific suggestions
individual judges can implement.
Joanne Slotnik (9:50): Joanne Slotnik,
who served as director of Utah’s Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission
from 2008 to 2016, discusses common
problems citizen courtroom observers
saw and ways judges might improve their
on-the-bench performance.
Terry Maroney (18:14): Vanderbilt
Law School Professor Terry Maroney sug-
gests that all judges can get better at deal-
ing with their own emotional reactions as
well as those of others. We explore with
her what emotions best enhance—or dis-
tract from—perceptions of fair treatment.
Dale Lefever (19:31): Now a consultant,
Dale Lefever has trained judges and doctors
for decades. He discusses how to build bet-
ter skills, including how to use videotape to
evaluate one’s own performance.
Daniel Becker (12:08): Utah State
Court Administrator Daniel Becker heads
up the administrative structure of a state-
court system that has, for many years,
regularly surveyed court users in each
local judicial district to get data evaluat-
ing the procedural fairness of its courts—
and then publicized the data and used it
to improve court performance. He dis-
cusses how such data can be used and
how it has been used in Utah. 
Kent Wagner (9:16): Kent Wagner
serves as the Executive Director of the
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance
Evaluation; he discusses the types of
comments that are commonly made in
surveys about judges, and common areas
judges might focus on for improvement.
Bert Brandenburg (9:24): Bert Bran-
denburg was Executive Director of Jus-
tice at Stake at the time of this interview.
He discussed the extensive work Justice
at Stake has done on public opinion
about the courts.
Carl Reynolds (5:00): Carl Reynolds,
formerly (from 2005 to 2012) the Texas
State Court Administrator, discusses the
use of measurement tools to assess court
performance in fairness, as well as how
best to train judges about procedural-fair-
ness concepts.
In addition to these interviews, we
also have videotaped statements provided
by two state supreme court chief justices
about procedural fairness in the courts of
their states:
Then-Alaska Chief Justice Dana Fabe
(4:09): She tells about the decision to
place a poster pledging fairness at the
entrance to every courthouse in Alaska. 
Utah Chief Justice Matthew B. Dur-
rant (2:40): He discusses the emphasis
the state courts of Utah have placed on
procedural fairness, along with specific
steps taken by Utah courts and judges.
We hope you find these materials of
interest. The project was supported by
Grant No. 2010-DD-BX-K034 awarded
by the Bureau of Justice Assistance to the
American Judges Association. Points of
view or opinions expressed in the inter-
views are those of the speakers and do
not represent the views of either AJA or
the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs.
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